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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF U'TAH 
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, I~C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT COUN-
CIL 67, \VESTERN C 0 N FER-
ENCE OF TEAJ\1STERS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD oF TEAMSTERS, CHAUF-
FEURS, vVAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF A:ThfERICA, AFL-
CIO, MILO B. RASH, CLARENCE 
LOTT, AND JOSEPH w. BALLEW, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 
8823 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action against the defend-
ants to recover from them the sum of $125,000.00. It is 
in substance alleged in the complaint: That plaintiff, a 
corporation, w.as at all times mentioned in the com-
plaint engaged in the business of buying Swiss cheese 
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and other dairy products from the Cache Valley Dairy 
Association of Amalga, Cache County, Utah, and trans-
porting and selling the same toN. Dorman & Company, 
Inc., in New York City, and also buying and selling gen-
eral merchandise. 
That for more than two years prior to July, 1955, 
plaintiff purehased from the above mentioned Dairy 
Association approximately $1,500,000.00 worth of Dairy 
Products and transported and sold the same to Dorman 
& Company, and that tractor-trailer units were purchased 
by plaintiff for use in transporting such products. That 
plaintiff had established a profitable business with Dor-
man & Company and others, which included the purchase 
of merchandise to transport from the East to the West, 
and tjhat such business produced the plaintiff a net in-
come of approximately $1000.00 per month during the 
years 1953 and 1954. 
That while the above mentioned Cache Yalley Dairy 
A8sociation was engaged in the business of manufactur-
ing Swiss cheese and other dairy products, in about April, 
1955, defendant Local 976 made a den1and upon said 
Dairy Association for a eonference to secure recognition 
as bargaining agent for the employees of said Associa-
tion, but such de1nand was refused because there was no 
proof that the ones who elaimed the right to represent the 
employees were authorized to represent the employees 
of said Association. 
That in order to compel said Dairy Association to 
<·.mnply with the demand of said Local for recognition 
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as such bargaining agent, defendants wrongfully, illegally 
and maliciously conspired and confederated together to 
prevent the delivery to said Dorman & Company of 
cheese produced by said Association. That Local Union 
976 was not the certified representative of the majority 
of the employees of said Association, or of the employees 
of plaintiff, nor had plaintiff or any of its ernployees 
been involved in a controversy between said Association 
and said Local Union 976, but on the contrary, plain-
tiff was an independent purchaser of cheese from said 
Association, which it sold to Dorman & Company in 
New York City. That notwithstanding said facts, de-
fendants, on or about July 25, 1955, and thereafter 
pursuant to said conspiracy by picketing said Dorman 
& Company's premises and the motor truck of plaintiff 
at said Company's loading dock in New York was, by 
said picketing .and coercion and threats, and by enlisting 
said Local 277 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
of which Local Union the employees of Dorman & Com-
pany were members, induced and persuaded said em-
ployees to refuse to handle or unload from plaintiff's 
trucks t'he cheese owned by plaintiff, and prevented 
pl.aintiff from making delivery thereof. 
That by reason of the acts complained of plaintiff 
has been damaged in the sum of $125,000.00 for which 
amount plaintiff prayed judgment against defendants. 
Defendant, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and IIelpers of Ameri-
ca, appeared specially and moved that the pretended 
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service of Summons upon them be stricken. Such Mo-
tion was supported by an affidavit of Joseph W. Ballew, 
one of the defendants. The motion was denied. 
The defendants, Mi1o B. Rash, Joseph W. Ballew 
and Local Union 976, and Joint Council 67, moved that 
the action be dismissed upon the ground that plaintiff 
had failed to exhaust its administrative remedy pursuant 
to the Labor :\lan.agement Relations Act, 1947, as amend-
ed, 29 U.S.C.A., Sec. 151, et seq., LRX 3751, and that the 
Court was without jurisdiction to hear and detennine the · 
subject matter set out in the complaint by reason of the 
above mentioned Labor ~Ianagement Relations Act. The 
motion was denied. 
In their answer the defendants denied generally the 
allegations of the complaint. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence defendants 
severally moved the Court to enter judgment in favor 
of each of the1n, or if that may not be done, that the 
Court direct the jury to find a verdict in favor of each 
of them. Tllis 1notion was based upon the following 
grounds: that the evidence fails to show that plain-
tiff has sustained any dmnages, and that the evidence 
fails to show that X. Dori.nan & C01npany refused to 
purcha~e .any 1no~·e eheese fro1u plaintiff because of the 
ads complained of. 
'l1he uwtion wa~ taken under advisement. (Tr. 232) 
r:rhe fon'going nwtion was renewed at the conclusion 
of all of' the evidence. (Tr. 340) Upon motion of counsel 
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for plaintiff the action was dismissed as to defendants, 
Rash and Lott. (Tr. 343) Later it was dismissed as to 
defendant Ballew. 
Edwin Gossner testified in substance as follows: 
That since 1941 he had resided in Cache County, 
Utah; that his profession is that of cheese making; that 
in 1941 he entered into a contract with Cache Valley 
Dairy Association to manufacture Swiss cheese and other 
dairy products on a percentage basis. ( Tr. 8) That the 
principal market for Swiss cheese in 1943 was the Kraft 
Cheese Company in Pocatello. Later a 1narket was de-
veloped in Los Angeles and San Francisco. In 1945 
and 1946 a market was secured with N. Dorman & Com-
pany in New York. That prior to 1950 most of the 
cheese was shipped by rail. (Tr. 9) Shipping by rail-
road was slow and the r.ates to New York high, and it 
· became impossible to con1pete with cheese frmn Wis-
consin. That the witness discussed the matter of truck-
ing cheese to ~ew York. (Tr. 10) That the Cache 
Valley Association did not want to get into the truck-
ing business; that to make it profitable to operate a 
trucking business it was necessary to have a back-haul 
from the East to the West ; that the Cache \r alley Dairy 
Association was a co-operative of farmers organized 
under the laws of Utah and as such were pern1itted to 
process and rnarket their products, but could not buy 
and sell other products. (Tr. 11) rrhat the Cache Valley 
Dairy Association asked the witness if he would not be 
interested in taking over the business of hauling the 
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cheese to market; that in September, 1952, he formed 
plaintiff corporation. (Tr. 12) That the purpose of 
organizing plaintiff corporation was to buy and sell 
dairy products, principally Swiss cheese, from the Cache 
Valley Dairy Association, and take it to the· eastern 
market, and when possible buy whatever c-Ould be bought 
in the East and bring it back to Utah, and thereby make 
a profit for Edwin Gossner and his family. The stock-
holders of plaintiff corporation consisted of the witness, 
his wife, his son and daughter, and Arnie Hansen. The 
witness was the president, his wife vice president, and 
Arnie Hansen the Secretary-Treasurer. (Tr. 13) That 
the business was surprisingly successful. The equipment 
of plaintiff was not new; that a profit was made on 
each trip and additional equipment was purchased; that 
back-hauls were received from New York and vicinity. 
That Arnie Hansen was the bookkeeper for plaintiff; 
that plaintiff started out with four Ford tractors and 
three trailers most of the time. (Tr. 14) Two were used 
constantly for the New York haul. While one was going 
East, one was going 'Vest. At times two men went on 
the trips, and at times only one. At times in '54 and '55 
there were as 1nany as fifteen men on plaintiff's' payroll, 
and .at times not more than seYen or eight, and at times 
a~ few as five. That the average load of cheese to 
New York was 15 tons, or 30,000 pounds; that the 
Dorman Company purchased practically all of the cheese 
shipped to New York. (Tr. 15) That at times Dorman 
& Cmnpany purchased as mueh as 50% of the chee~e 
produced hy Cache Vnlley, and at times only about 30% 
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thereof. That of plaintiff's income as 1nuch as 60 to 
70 per cent came frmn cheese sold to Dorman & Com-
pany, but considering the back-haul it amounted to as 
much as 80 to 90 per cent. (Tr. 16) 
That after July 28th plaintiff did not continue to 
ship cheese to Donnan & Compan;· as it had done, in 
fact, did not ship more cheese until sometime in Septenl-
ber. (Tr. 17) That at the time he learned there was 
trouble about unloading the cheese the witness went to 
~ew York where he had a conversation with _Mr. Ballew 
and Mr. Rash; that a _Mr. Ristuccia c.ame to the place of 
business of Dormans in New York; Mr. Ballew said he 
would like to talk with the witness about the dispute with 
the Union and the Cache Valley Dairy Association. 
(Tr. 19) r:rhat about Septen1ber 29th the witness had 
a conversation with Messers. Lou and Vic Dorman and 
Ballew; that Mr. Ballew stated what he wanted, and the 
witness stated he would see what could be done, and 
that he would meet Mr. Ballew in Utah. That the witness 
saw .Nir. Rash outside of the office of the Dormans and 
had a talk with him. (Tr. 20) Mr. Rash said they were 
not hard to get along with, and that the Union could 
do the witness a lot of harm; that the witness s.aid he 
would meet him back in Utah. That Swiss c:heese is 
highly perishable. It 1nust have constant refrigeration; 
that the average value of a truck load of cheese is $1~,-
000.00; th.at witness has not heard of any dispute between 
plaintiff and its employees. (Tr. 21) That Local 976 of 
the Teamsters Union was not at that time certified by 
the National Labor Board as the bargaining agent of 
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the employees of Cache Valley Dairy; that witness does 
not know whether any of the Teamsters Union were em-
ployees of the Cache Valley Dairy. (Tr. 22) That about 
September 4th a truck load of cheese was loaded on an 
Interstate truck and another truck was ordered, but it did 
not come because they said we were having labor troubles; 
that witness called Mr. Rash and said he could not meet 
with him, and within an hour .after the conversation a 
truck from Interstate appeared and took a load of cheese 
to Dorman; that several loads ''rere shipped, and witness 
received word that there was one load in New York that 
could not be unloaded. (Tr. 23) That the load went into 
storage in the name of Cache Valley Dairy Assn.; that the 
cheese was sent on plaintiff's truck and it paid storage 
on the cheese ; that Dairy Distributors sent one load of 
cheese to Dormans in the early part of September, which 
went into storage. Plaintiff sent one load to Dormans 
late in October, which was unloaded: that no cheese was 
sent to Donnans after October. Son1e cheese was hauled 
to Salt Lake, but 1nost of the equip1nent of plaintiff 
stood idle. (Tr. 26) That Donnans wanted the cheese; 
that after the episode in X ew York the cheese was ship-
ped to ~ew York by independent trucks. (Tr. 27) That 
plaintiff i~ still in existence. but it has done no business 
to amount to anything since 1956, and practically none 
in the lattrr part of 1935. except for the equip1nent which 
pia in tiff lea~P<i. and son1e hauls 1nade in the local area. 
That th<' equip1nent of plaintiff was solN6-rthe best 
price that eould be obtained. (Tr. 28) 
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Over objections of counsel for defendants, witness 
was permitted to testify as to the profits made by plain-
tiff during the ye.ar 1953-1954 and 1955. We quote the 
following from his testimony : 
"These profits would vary depending on how 
much cheese we would ship a month, how much 
back haul we had a month, a load, how much back 
haul we had how much profit we made on what 
we bought in New York and resold up here, but 
it would average out about one thousand dollars 
a month net profit over a two and one half year 
or three year period." 
Witness stated he made a profit on the equipment 
because the equipment was set up on a depreciation 
schedule. (Tr. 29) 
On cross examination :Mr. Gossner testified that the 
profit of plaintiff was made from the sales of the pro-
duct ''which you would call brokerage, I guess.'' That 
there was one load of plaintiff that went into the w,are-
house and one load of Cache Valley Dairy that went into 
storage. (Tr. 31) That witness did not own the cheese; 
that he produces the cheese and sells it. When witness 
is not at the plant, the shipping desk takes the order and 
ships the cheese. ( Tr. 32) All of the cheese is made by 
the employees of witness. (Tr. 33) The assets of plain·-
tiff, when organized, consisted of an International truck 
and trailer, a Ford pickup truck, a Ford Tractor, a 
Fruehauf trailer and another Freuhauf semi-trailer. 
(Tr. 35) That witness did not know whether the Inter-
national belonged to the Cache Valley Dairy Association, 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
but if it did, plaintiff paid for the s.ame; that witness had 
some of the equipment in his own name when plaintiff 
was incorporated. ( Tr. 36) That the caterpillar trac-
tor was part of the assets of plaintiff, but it was not used 
in transportation; that witness, the auditor and book-
keeper appraised the property that was conveyed to 
plaintiff, and stock taken for the appraised value thereof. 
(Tr. 37) That the caterpillar tractor was not used to 
ship cheese to ~ ew York; that plaintiff could have gone 
into most anything under its Articles of Incorporation. 
(Tr. 38) That most of the equipment of plaintiff has 
been sold. It still has a Fruehauf trailer; the rest is 
worn out or sold. (Tr. 39) That :Jir. Rash said he would 
picket wherever plaintiff went in business ; that plain-
tiff went out of business because of picketing. (Tr. 40) 
That witness operates the cheese plant on a 15% gross 
profit contract. The cheese plant was operated by wit-
ness who hired and fired the employees. (Tr. 41) That 
from ti1ne to time an agreement was had whereby the 
Dairy Association sold its cheese to plaintiff. (Tr. 42) 
That witness had a Contract with the Association where-
by he was to receive 15 ~c of the sale of the cheese, but 
he got only 13% for the most part. The cheese sold 
to Donnans was bought fr01n the Cache Valley Dairy; 
that the total a1nount of business done by plaintiff was 
about one and a half 1nillion dollars per year, but that 
included the profit8 1nade on the property bought back 
East. (Tr. 43) Not 1nuch cheese was hauled to San Fran-
<·i:o;<•o and Los _Angeles; that the only deliveries that 
could be n1ade were to Donnans. (Tr. 44) 
10 
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Defendants' Exhibit 1 was received 1n evidence, 
which was executed by the witness. 
It is dated July :21, 1956, and was calculated to enable 
Stanley Forte to secure a permit from the United States 
Commerce Commission to haul Cache Valley Dairy As-
sociation products to New York. It contains, among 
others, these provisions : 
"neither Interstate nor any of the other carriers 
operating from points in Utah to Chicago has 
ever evidenced any great interest in our move-
ment. We sought their services from time to time 
and invariably encountered delays in pickup, in 
travel time, and, occasionally, had some difficulty 
about the condition of the cheese upon its arrival 
in New York'' * * * ''for these reasons we at 
one time purchased our own equipment." (Tr. 50) 
That the witness signed the instrument as Manager of 
the Cache Valley Dairy Association. (Tr. 51) That 
Cache Valley Dairy Association and Dairy Distributors 
had over the r,oad problems. ( Tr. 54) The document 
further stated that: 
Also: 
''If the general freight carriers had given 
us a satisfactory service, we never would have 
gone to the tremendous expense of buying our 
own equipment." 
''I am the general manager of Cache Valley 
Dairy Association located at Smithfield, Utah and 
have seen the statement submitted by Interstate 
Motor Lines, Inc., in opposition to the instant 
application.'' 
11 
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and 
''We tried to escape the problem of selling 
f.o.b. Smithfield and placing transportation mat-
ters in the hands of our customers, but we can-
not always do that. N. Dorman and Company 
has been leasing a truck from the applicant on 
movements sold f.o.b. Smithfield and they pick 
up at Smithfield with the leased equipment." 
(Tr. 56) 
That all of Stanley Forte's trucks ·were mechanically 
refrigerated; that cheese is highly perishable and must 
reach New York without any sudden change in tempera-
ture. (Tr. 61) That cheese should be kept at between 
35° and 40° but 1nay be as low as 32°. (Tr. 62) That 
there is a risk in using ice to control the temperature; 
that plaintiff had no automatic refrigeration. (Tr. 63) 
Arnie Hansen was called as a witness by plaintiff, 
and in substance testified as follows: 
That he resides at Logan and at one time was a 
bookkeeper for plaintiff. (Tr. 64) That invoices were 
made every ti1ne a sale was made and he had a payroll, 
and the books were kept in the ordinary 1nanner: that the 
entries were 1nade in the book in1mediately after the 
transactions were had. ( Tr. 65) 
Exhibit P-:2 was offered in endence, consisting of 
sheets purporting to show business operations of plain-
tiff for tlw ~·par In5:2 up to and including 1955 and 1956. 
(Tr. 67) 
On cross exa1uination the witness testified that the 
books ~howPd all purchases regardless of when made; 
12 
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that purchases made in New York are reflected in the 
books; that he does not have the invoices. ( Tr. 67) The 
books were offered in evidence, to which Counsel stated 
no objection would be made at this time, but probably 
objections would be made after the witness was further 
interrogated; that further cross examination would 
later be had after an opportunity was had to exmnine 
the books. (Tr. 68) 
Paul B. Tanner was called as a witness by plain-
tiff, and in substance testified as follows : 
That he is a Certified Public Accountant; that he 
has done work for the Dairy Distributors Company in 
making annual audits of its books; that Exhibit P -3 con-
tain financial information concerning certain periods 
of activity of Dairy Distributors, Inc. It contains balance 
sheets as of April 30th, 1956, comparative statements for 
fiscal years September 30, 1953, September 30, 1954, 
September 30, 1955 and the short period to April 30, 
1956. 
The Exhibit was offered in evidence. 
Mr. Tanner on cross examination further testified 
that the Exhibit merely contained a sum1nary of the in-
formation contained in the books of plaintiff. (Tr. 70) 
The Exhibit was received in evidence . 
.1fr. Gassner was recalled and further testified on 
cross examination: That Dormans did tell the witness 
that cheese was received that was too hot; that he did 
13 
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not rernember if it was the trucks of plaintiff or others; 
that cheese could be too warm and yet not damaged; 
that witness did not think the cheese of plaintiff was 
f:;econd grade. That witness did not have a written con-
tract with plaintiff. (Tr. 75) That there was a contract 
with Cache Valley and Local Union 97 6 in 1946, which 
remained in effect until 1952, when an increase in wages 
was demanded and the Company said it would not give 
the employees the increase, and no contract was signed 
after that time. (Tr. 76) 
~ir. Gossner was asked what was the nature of his 
certificate to haul over the public highway long line, to 
which objection was raised that there was nothing in 
the pleading about violating the regulations of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. The objection was sus-
tained. (Tr. 81) That there may have been times that 
plaintiff hauled furnaces, pianos, automobile parts and 
articles of that character. (Tr. 82) That calcium chloride 
was one of the principal articles that were picked up in 
Ohio and hauled back, which was sold to different con-
cerns in the intermountain area. That calcium chloride 
was houled back thirty or forty times. (Tr. 83) That 
plaintiff has not had an Interstate Commerce Commis-
f;ion permit. It had the necessary legal permits to operate 
on the highways. (Tr. 84) That witness was unable to 
namP the pern1its that plaintiff had; that witness re-
ePived the 15 or 13 JWr cent as his profit on the cheese 
sold in New York. ( Tr. 85) That the cheese was sold 
by the Cache \ .. alley Dairy Association to Dairy Distribu-
torR, nnd Dairy Distributors sold to Dorn1an. That the 
14 
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Associat~on produced the milk and furnished the build-
ing, and witness bore the expense of manufacturing the 
milk into cheese, (Tr. 86); that the trucks were picketed 
twice at the Dorman docks, once on the 27th or 28th of 
July, and once around October 30th or 31st. That witness 
does not know how long the trucks were picketed. (Tr. 
87) That plaintiff's truck was unloaded after working 
hours on the day it arrived in New York. (Tr. 88) That 
he believed he attempted to re1nain in business; that 
Dormans wouldn't unload .any more Dairy Distributor 
cheese; that Victor Dorman told hin1 that. (Tr. 89) 
That truck loads were sent after he was told that the 
Dormans would not unload any more cheese, and the 
cheese was unloaded; one of the loads went to storage, 
but that load was not picketed. (Tr. 90) That some of 
the conversations with the Dormans about unloading 
the cheese was over the telephone and smne in writing; 
that witness had a conversation in the presence of Mr. 
Ballew with Victor Dorman; that the Dormans did not 
tell witness that all cheese sent would be received and 
unloaded. (Tr. 91) That witness knew the contents of 
Exhibit 1, and also knew that Stanley F·orte was hauling 
Cache Valley Dairy Association cheese to New York. 
(Tr. 92-93) That at no time w.as there a written con-
tract whereby the Dairy Distributors bought cheese from 
the Cache Valley Association, or whereby the Dormans 
agreed to purchase the cheese; that all of the agreements 
were oral. (Tr. 94) That Dormans were buying cheese 
from plaintiff since its organization. ( Tr. 97) That the 
Cache Valley Dairy did not feel they could make a sue-
15 
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rer:;s in hauling cheese to market; that Cache Valley also 
shipped some cheese with Forte, who is continuing to 
haul its cheese. (Tr. 98) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4 was offered in evidence and 
objected to by defendants, and the matter of its admis-
sion taken under advisement. (Tr. 100) 
Milo Rash, one of the defendants was called as a 
witness by plaintiff, and in part testified as follows: 
That he is the Secretary-Treasurer of Local Union 
976, and a Trustee of Joint Council 67; that about May 
31, 1955, he made a trip with Joseph Ballew to New 
York; that he expected to see Louie Dorman. (Tr. 102) 
That he saw ~Ir. Ristuccia, the Secretary-Treasurer of 
the Local Union, some of whose members are employees 
of the Donnans, before he sa\Y the Dormans. (Tr. 103) 
That witness did not tell Yic Dorman that he would picket 
the Donnans if they handled any 1nore Dairy Distribu-
tors cheese; that he did not show hin1 a picket: that 
when the matter of picketing was talked about witness 
said he would take his chances and .answer in the courts. 
(Tr. 104) That witness did do some picketing on Jul}· 
26, 195fl. That he carried a picket sign, which is marked 
P-11; that ~lr. Lott is shown in Exhibit P-9, and two 
other~. one of whom is Yictor Donnan. (Tr. 105) That 
the person shmYn in Exhibit P-8 appears to be the ·wit-
ne~~ <·a 1T~·ing a sign whieh reads: .. X otice, the cheese 
en rriPd. and delivPred by this truck has been worked and 
pro<·P~sPd. b~· non-Vnion employees of the Cache Valley 
na i ry ,\ ~soeia tion, Sn1ithfield. '~ That in Exhibits P-7 
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and P-6 appear to be the witness, Mr. Lott and Victor 
Dorman. (Tr. 106 That in P-5 appears to be the witness 
and the driver of the truck. Exhibits P-3 through P-11 
were received in advance. (Tr. 107) That witness picket-
ed the truck twice on July 26th and 27th, 1955; that 
witness did not picket a truck in October, 1955; that wit-
ness did not picket Dormans so that the employees of 
Dormans would not cross the picket line. (Tr. 108) That 
he has been connected with the Teamsters Union since 
July :27, 1942; that witness does not advise his members 
not to cross a picket line; that the signs were carried 
around the truck to induce Mr. Gossner to meet with 
witness like the National Labor Relations Board had 
ordered him to do. (Tr. 109) 
Witness first went to N. Dorman & Company build-
ing, and the next morning went to Ristuccia's office, 
and Ristuccia asked Dorman to come to his office. 
On cross examination witness testified he had a 
talk with 1\lr. Rosen, the foreman of Dorman's employ-
ees; that he did not tell him not to unload the cheese. 
(Tr. Ill) That he told M.r. Rosen they were having 
trouble with Cache Valley Dairy Association and Dairy 
Distributors, and they were there to picket the truck; 
that witness has not discussed this matter with Mr. Ris-
tuccia or received his cooperation. (Tr. 112) That the 
ethics of an international organization require that when 
you go into his territory you inforrn the local union why 
you are there; that was the reason for calling on the Local 
Union in New York; that the New York Union was en-
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tirely independent from the Union of which the witness 
was a member; that the truck was picketed for about 
an hour and twenty Ininutes on July 26th. (Tr. 113) The 
truck was unloaded the next evening after 5:00 o'clock; 
that the truck was unloaded while witness was picketing; 
that so far as witness knows all of the trucks from Goss-
ner were unloaded; that the truck that was picketed by 
witness was unloaded by the employees of Dorman; that 
the purpose of going to Xew York was to talk to Mr: 
Dorman and to put pressure on Mr. Gossner with respect 
to Gossner's refusal to bargain. (Tr. 114) That Gossner 
met with the Union, but never bargained with it; that 
charges were filed with the X ational Labor Relations 
Board before witness went to Ogden in September, 1952. 
(Tr. 115) That the Board ordered Mr. Gossner to bar-
gain with his employees; that witness does not have any 
relation with the International Union nor with the West-
ern Conference of Teamsters; that witness does not rep-
resent the Western Conference of Teamsters, nor the In-
ternational; there is just an affiliation, just a per capita 
tax affiliation. -·w·itness Inade the first trip to New York 
with Mr. Ballew and ~Ir. Lott; that .Mr. Lott is connected 
with 983. ~lr. Ballew has no connection with the Local 
Union of witness. (Tr.116) The Local Union or the West-
ern Conference did not do any picketing in New York; 
that is in ~fay, 1955, when the witness went to New York. 
The einployees of the Caehe Valley Dairy Association 
were not paying- any dues to the Teamsters Union, but 
they had not been decertified~ that witness would say 
that he n'presented thein. (Tr. 117) Local Union 976 is 
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affiliated with Joint Council 67; that witness does not 
know that Joint Council 67 is part of the Teamsters 
Western Conference of Teamsters; that labor charges 
were brought against Mr. Gossner and Cache Valley 
Dairy Association before 1952, but the hearing was had 
after 1952. ( Tr. 118) That witness had not been certified 
by the National Labor Relations Board when he went 
back to New York on May 31, 1955; that witness had a 
contract with employees of the Dairy Distributors be-
fore 1955; that witness did not know of any difference 
between the employees of Cache Valley Dairy Association 
and Dairy Distributors. (Tr. 119) 
The Court sustained the objection to Exhibit P-4. 
(Tr. 120) 
On redirect examination Mr. Rash further testified 
that Local 976 was in trusteeship; that John M. Annan 
of Los Angeles is the Trustee; witness believes he is 
appointed to that position. (Tr. 122) That witness does 
not recall having had any communication with Mr. An-
nan; that witness does not pay dues to the International 
Union, but to 976; that a per capita tax is turned over 
to the International Union. (Tr. 123) Mr. John M. An-
nan is President of Joint Council 42; that the amount 
of dues from members of the local union is 40c per 
month per member; that a per capita tax is also paid 
to the Western Dairy Council. (Tr. 124) Local Union 
976 is wholly independent of 277 of New York and of 
Joint Council 42 of Los Angeles, and of any other or-
ganization; that Mr. Ballew accompanied witness to 
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New York. He was not on the payroll of 976. (Tr. 125) 
Mr. Ballew is an employee of Western Dairy Employees 
and was loaned to the local union to assist in this matter 
under the direction of witness; that so far as the witness 
knows none of the trucks of Cache Valley Association 
or Dairy Distributors or :Mr. Gossner were ever refused 
at the docks of Dorman & Company in ~ ew York; that 
the employees of Cache Valley Dairy worked part of 
their time for Dairy Distributors. (Tr. 126) That the 
Western Conference of Teamsters has jurisdiction over 
eleven western states. (Tr. 127) That "witness never 
picketed any trucks in New York after July 27th. 
The depositions of Harry Rosen, Louis Dorman, 
Arthur Nigro and Victor Dorman were ordered publish-
ed. Part of the testilnony of Harry Rosen was read to 
the Court and jury. Following is a summary of the same: 
That he is and for between :25 and 30 years has been 
e1nployed by N. Dorman & Company. That he is a fore-
Inan and supen~ises the loading and unloading of mer-
ehandise in and out of the place of business. He has 
been a n1e1nber of the local union for at least fifteen 
years. (Tr. 130) That witness ean1e down early to have 
a truck unlo.aded; that two men crone to the truck, 
and a 1nan told witness not to unload the same; that 
witness knew nothing about any trouble and had not 
been told not to unload the truck. (Tr. 131) That one 
of tiiP gentlen1en said he had pern1ission from the Local 
Union to pieket there. "Titness refused to unload the 
<'IIPPSe until he rpeeived word fron1 the Union: that 
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witness called Mr. Donnan, and witness and the Dor-
man brothers decided not to unload the truck that 
day because they did not want any labor trouble; 
that at a later ti1ne he had a conversation with :Mr. Ris-
tuccia about cheese from Smithfield, Utah. ( Tr. 132) 
About a week or two later witness asked Mr. Ristuccia 
if it was all right to unload another trailer with eheese 
from Smithfield, and was told to go back to his place 
and his men would be told what to do. That was the 
end; that witness did not unload the cheese. vVitness does 
not recall any picketing at his place in October. (Tr. 133) 
Witness did not know whether the trucks were Cache 
Valley Dairy or Distributors; that to the witness they 
were all the same. ( Tr. 135) No one told witness not 
to unload the truck, but he did not want to unload the 
truck with the picket there; that witness assumed he had 
a right to unload or refuse to unload the truck. ( Tr. 135) 
The truck was unloaded after the witness left; that wit-
ness did not want to antagonize the Union. (Tr. 136) 
That so far as witness knew the truck was unloaded by 
Dorman's employees. (Tr. 140) 
Joseph vV. Ballew, one of defendants, was called as 
a witness by plaintiff, and in part testified as follows: 
That he has resided at Seattle, \Vashington, since 
about June, 1957, and is a representative of Western 
States Dairy Employees Council; that its functions are 
to assist other Local Unions, when requested, in negotia-
tion of contracts, disputes and strikes involving em-
ployee' rights; that witness was sent to assist the Local 
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Union in Ogden. (Tr. 142) That the purpose of going 
to New York was to induce 1\!Ir. Dorman not to buy cheese 
from the Dairy Distributors or Cache Valley Dairy, and 
to persuade :.Mr. Gossner to meet and bargain with re-
spect to his employees; that the Western Conference of 
Teamsters is not a part of the International Union; the 
\V estern Conference of Teamsters embraces the eleven 
western states; that Mr. Brewster, its President, holds 
an office in the International Union. (Tr. 143) That 
when the deposition of the witness was taken he testified 
that Western Conference of Teamsters was affiliated 
with and a part of the International Union. (Tr. 144) 
That witness accompanied ~{r. Rash to New York over 
:Memorial Day weekend; that the Dormans seemed to be 
interested in helping witness out in his request. (Tr. 
145) The Dormans stated they wanted the cheese, and 
they couldn't duplicate it anywhere; that the Dormans 
stated they did not wish any difficulties with their em-
ployees. (Tr. 146) \Yitness went with :Mr. Lott and Mr. 
Rash to New York to impress on ~fr. Dorman the serious-
nel'f' of the problem and to secure a meeting with Mr. 
Go~sner. No threats were n1ade to Mr. Dorman or any-
one else: that on l\fay 31st he met ~fr. Louis Dorman, 
\dlO called Mr. Gossner on the telephone. (Tr. 148) That 
witness again 1net the Donuans in the afternoon and 
stated to witness that :\lr. Gossner had been talked to, 
hut rlid not know what he would do. (Tr. 149) The West-
Prn Conferenee of Tea1nsters is not a union. (Tr. 150) 
No picketing was done in ~lay when the witness went 
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to New Y,,ork; that later picketing was done as a last 
resort. (Tr. 150) 
Ross rrhoresen was called as a witness by plaintiff, 
and in part testified as follows : 
He had been employed by Cache Valley Dairy 
Association. (Tr. 176) That was in 1952. He is a 
labor relations counsel and advisor, and represents the 
employers in Utah; he was einployed to represent 
the Cache Valley Dairy Association, which at the time 
was bargaining with the Teamsters; along about 1951 
there had been a strike that continued for about 30 days; 
that there was an unfair labor practice case filed by the 
Union against the Company, and an order made that the 
Cache Valley Dairy bargain with its employees. (Tr. 177) 
Meetings were had about the contract that should be en-
tered into; that obsticles existed about wages and the 
union shop; :\Ir. Gossner insisted that wages could not 
be increased because the price of cheese had gone down. 
(Tr. 178). .Mr. Rash, who represented the employees, 
said the wages in Star Valley were twenty per cent less 
than at Cache Valley Co-op, but still insisted on a raise 
in wages; that witness informed ~lr. Rash that Cache 
Valley Dairy would not raise the wages; that the Labor 
Relations Board finally closed the files on the case. (Tr. 
179) In 1955 witness assisted :\'1 r. Gossner in determin-
ing what was deemed a fair wage; Mr. Rash wrote .a 
letter to the employees of the Cache Valley Dairy Asso-
ciation stating they were suspended because they were 
not paying their dues, and witness ceased negotiating 
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with .\lr. Rash. On July 26, 1955, Mr. Gossner called 
the attention of witness to trouble he was having with 
getting the cheese unloaded at Dormans, but wit-
ness said he could do nothing for him in that matter; 
~lr. Gossner instructed witness to do what he could about 
the activity of interfering with the delivery of cheese 
in ~ew York. (Tr. 180) That witness fled unfair labor 
practice complaints in New York growing out of the 
trouble at Dormans; that there was some delay caused 
h :,~ a question of whether the matter should be heard in 
~ ew York or San Francisco. Objection wa~ made to the 
inquiry as being innnaterial. (Tr. 181) 
\Yitness further testified he was in Xew York on 
October 31, 1955, where he had a conversation with Mr. 
Ballew and ~fr. Rash at the courthouse. ~Ir. Ballew said 
they would picket whenever they felt like it. (Tr. 184) 
A n1eeting wat: had by witness and :Jir. Gossner with 
~lr. Rash and :Jlr. Ballew .and attorney Reid Xeilson at 
the Ben Lomond Hotel on August lOth; a proposed 
contract was shown witness, which he looked over and 
returned : the contract contained the usual provisions, but 
wi tnP~~ did not think :Jlr. Rash and ~Ir. Ballew had 
authorit~~ to represent the en1ployees of Carhe Valley 
J>air~·. (Tr. 185) The Union had not been certified as 
the bargaining agent for the en1ployees of the Cache 
\T allPy Dai r~·. Di~eus~ion ''".as had about the wages which 
t liP einp]o~'PP~ desired. (Tr. 186) ~lr. Rash stated the 
('lllplo~·rp~ \Yonld be satisfied with an increase of ten 
or fiftern ePnts per hour. 
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Upon cross examination, Mr. Thoresen testified he 
had specialized in labor relation matters for about ten 
years representing about 200 employers. (Tr. 187) That 
at the meeting on August lOth witness stated Rash and 
Ballew did not represent the employees of Cache Valley 
Dairy. ( Tr. 191) Witness, in the petition filed with the 
Board in San Francisco, asked for an election. Later he 
asked that the petition be withdrawn and it was with-
drawn. (Tr. 192) That at the meeting held on Septem-
ber 5, 1955, witness said there was no need of holding 
an election of the employees of the Dairy Distributors 
because there were none. At the meeting held on Aug-
ust lOth witness stated he would consider the proposition 
presented to him, but later he told Mr. Rash he did 
not believe that he, Rash, represented the employees. 
(Tr. 194) 
Arne Hansen on cross examination further testified: 
That he began as bookkeeper for Dairy Distributors 
in 1952. (Tr. 209) That he was also bookkeeper for 
Mr. Gossner. (Tr. 210) That the audit made by Mr. 
Tanner relates to the Dairy Distributors only; that the 
Dairy Distributors had $15,000.00 or $16,000.00 worth of 
equipment when the witness began to keep books. (Tr. 
211) That the assets were $35,000.00 when it com1nenced 
business; that there was a depreciation value of $30,-
290.00 at the close of the year 1956; that was a decrease 
of about $5,000.00; that no dividends were p.aid by the 
Company. (Tr. 212) That the Company bought goods in 
the East and resold them; that witness could not tell the 
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amount that was paid or the amount for which it was 
sold; that witness could tell from the books the amount 
that was received from the sales. (Tr. 213) That witness 
has not segregated the sales, and does not know what the 
sales and purchases have been; that the amount of profits 
varied; that some hauls would make five thousand, some 
might make 100o/o, some make 2%; that he would say 
that some resulted in a 1oss; that they were not in busi-
ness to lose. (Tr. 214) That witness could not tell what 
was made in he hauling and what was made in the 
buying and selling; that there might be son1ething hauled 
in on which a straight freight charge was made; that wit-
ness could not tell the amount paid for hauling freight, or 
the amount that was realized from the purchase and 
sale of property; that he has no judgment at all about 
the a1nount realized from either source. (Tr. 215) That 
it would take a week to get the information as to the 
source of profit for one year. (Tr. 216) That it would 
be a job to get the infonnation; that it would be necessary 
to have a bill of lading to pay the bills. (Tr. 217) That 
the merchandise was bought .and sold; that the charges 
for freight would be shown in the books. (Tr. 218) That 
the witness did not report as a profit if the value of a 
truck went up; that articles were sold for more than 
the costs after allowing for depreciation, which was put 
in for a profit. (Tr. :220) That the ledger does not show 
fr01n whon1 1nerchandi~e w.as bought; that witness did 
not <·arry a n\eord of accounts ~ble (Tr. 221) That 
after Oc.tober 1, 1955, until..--~ptenlber 30th two trucks 
and one trailer were ~ola. (Tr. 222) That witness 
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could not tell the amount of liabilities at the time of 
the organization of plaintiff, but there were contracts 
payable in the sum of $11,200.00. (Tr. 223) That the 
assets we re $30,000.00 when the books were closed in 
1956, and the liabilities $6,800.00; that the liabilities 
when the Company began business would be approxi-
mately $39,000.00; that the assets were $30,000.00; that 
when the report was made the assets were $56,131.00, 
and the liabilities were $6,808.71. (Tr 2 24) That Ex-
hibit P -3 shows that the Gossner Farm owed $1,322.82, 
and the Gossner Partnership owed $24,348.37, making 
a total owing by these two Gossner farms of $25,671.20; 
that is part of the assets of the Company; that witness 
thinks these items are collectible or have been paid, but 
he doesn't recall exactly. ( Tr. 225) That witness does 
not have all of the books ; that he does not know whether 
the Gossner accounts have been paid; that the liability 
that existed when the corporation was formed in the 
sum of $16,000.00 was for stock, and that is a part of 
the liability of $35,000.00 (Tr. 226) That the witness 
could not tell who owed the Company money other than 
the Gossners; that the people have all been solvent; that 
provision has been made for loss; that there are very 
few accounts which have caused trouble to collect. (Tr. 
227) That he could not tell for sure whether the accounts 
are collectible; that the Gossner farms are both partner-
ships. (Tr. 228) That witness does not know what the 
$24,348.47 owing by the Gossner Partnerships is for. 
(Tr. 229) 
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The plaintiff having rested, defendants jointly and 
severally moved the Court to enter a judgment in favor 
of defendants and against the plaintiff, or if that may not 
be done, that the Court direct the jury to bring in a 
verdict in favor of defendants and .against plaintiff; that 
to permit the case to go to the jury would be to permit 
it to speculate on the matter of whether plaintiff has 
sustained any damages on account of the acts complained 
of, and that any loss plaintiff may have suffered was 
not proximately caused by any acts of the defendants, 
or either of them, .and that there being no contract 
with the Dormans, it may not be said that defendants 
caused the Dormans to break the same, and the evidence 
fails to show that the Dormans refused to purchase more 
cheese from the plaintiff. The motion was taken under 
advisement. ( Tr. 232) 
LeRoy Schenk was called as a witness by defendants, 
and in part testified as follows : 
That he drove a truck for ~Ir. Gossner in haul-
ing cheese to X ew York from about October, 1949, 
to SPptPmber 6, 1955. (Tr. 233) That witness took a 
truckload of eheese to Xew York in July, 1955: that he 
arrived in New 1 ork about 5 :00 o'clock a.m.; that when 
he arrived at Donnans their foren1an, ~Ir. Harry Rosen, 
appeared; that ~I r. Lott and ~Ir. Rash also appeared. 
(Tr. :23...f-) That Lott and Rash put signs on themselves 
and walked back and forth behind the truck in front of 
tlw Donnan building, always in the Yicinity of the 
t ru<'k; that 1\lr. Rosen said he was going to call Mr. 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dorman for instructions as to what he should do. 
(Tr. ~35) That the Donnans appeared on the scene 
about 8 :00 o'clock, who told witness to wait, and that 
Lou Dorman said he w.as going to call :Mr. Gossner; that 
}!r. Dorman said he did not think they should unload 
the truck at that time; that the truck was then parked 
about half a block from the place; that the truck re1nained 
there until about 6 :00 o'clock the following .afternoon. 
(Tr. 236) That Louis Donnan told witness to bring the 
truck back in front of the building where the truck was 
unloaded. (Tr. :237) ) That Lou and Victor Dorn1an and 
one of their sons helped unload the truck; that the 
truck was being picketed when the same wa::; unloaded. 
( Tr. 238) That .another 1nan whose first name was 
Johnny also helped unload the truck; that in the last part 
of April, 1955, witness had a conversation with lllr. Goss-
ner. (Tr. 239) That the conversation was had in the 
office of ~Ir. Gossner when the witness and ~lr. Gossner 
were present; that .Ylr. Gossner at that time st.ated he 
would have to cut down on the men from two to one on 
the trucks because he was losing money. (Tr. 240) That 
after the conversation one man was used in the operation 
of the trucks, except in some instances; that a brother of 
the witness was also driving a truck. ( Tr. 241) That .at 
the time of the picketing the witness was employed by 
Dairy Distributors; that on other occasions the employees 
of the Dormans usually unloaded the trucks. ( Tr. 242) 
That an employee of the Dormans by the name of Nigro 
helped unload the truck; that during the time witness 
was driving trucks he was c.alled upon to do other work, 
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sonte of which was in the plant and some out on the 
fann. (Tr. 244) That a man named Johnny and another 
man named Nigro helped unload the truck. (Tr. 245) 
~Iilo B. Rash was recalled by defendants and in 
part testified as follows : 
That witness met in the Ben Lomond Hotel on 
August 10, 1955, with Mr. Reid Nielson, Joseph Bal-
]e,Y, Ross Thoresen and ~ir. Gossner: that a proposed 
contract had been given :Mr. Thoresen in New York, 
a copy of which was given ~Ir. Thoresen upon this 
occasion hy :Mr. Rash. (Tr. 249) That Mr. Rash told 
Jl r. Thoresen that if they could get decent wages, 
hours and working conditions, the witness thought he 
could get the employees to settle for an increase 
in wages for 10 to 15 cents per hour; that Thoresen 
stated he would submit a counterproposal the first 
of the following week. (Tr. 250) That Exhibit D-12 is 
the contract discussed. (Tr. 252) That a meeting was 
held in the Salt Lake Tribune Building on Deeember 6th 
at whirh Mr. Skolnick, Ross Thoresen, Reid Neilson, 
Milo Rash and Joe Ballew were present. (Tr. 253) 
That at the meeting Ross Thoresen had a paper drawn 
up for having an election at the Cache Y alley Dairy 
Association, which paper was signed by the witness and 
Ross Thoresen, and ~1:r. Thoresen stated he would also 
have a paper drawn up for the Dairy Distributors. (Tr. 
2!>4) That when the witness arrived Mr. Thoresen said 
he would not agree to an election for the Dairy Distribu-
tors beeause it 1night have two employees and that there 
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was not going to be an election; that Mr. Skolnick of 
the National Labor Relations Board stated there wouldn't 
be much use for an election when there were only two 
employees; that witness made his first trip to X C\V York 
Monday night over Memorial Day weekend in 1955. ( Tr. 
:253) That Joe Ballew accompanied witness on that trip; 
that the purpose of the trip was to persuade Dorman 
brothers to get ~lr. Gossner to meet for the purpose of 
negotiating .a contract covering wages, hours, working 
conditions of the employees of Cache Valley Dairy Asso-
ciation and the Dairy Distributors' drivers. That the 
next time the witness went to New York was July :25, 
1955, at which time Mr. Lott went with witness; that 
the purpose of the second trip to ~ ew York was the saxne 
as the first. ( Tr. 256) 
On cross examination witness said he picketed .a 
load of cheese at Dormans; that witness did not know 
when he picketed the c h e e s e ; that witness has 
been an officer of a Union since July 27, 1952; that 
witness has never told anyone not to cross .a picket line. 
(Tr. :257) That when he picketed the truck he was trying 
to impress }fr. Dorman. (Tr. 258) That witness does 
not know whether the picket signs had any effect on 
the employees of the Dormans. (Tr. 259) That so far 
as witness knew there was no place where the truck 
could be picketed except in New York. 
On cross examination the witness testified that he 
continued to picket the truck after it had been moved 
a half block away. (Tr. 260) That witness continued to 
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pi<·ket the truck until it was unloaded; that the employees 
of Dormans could not have unloaded the truck where it 
was parked. (Tr. 261) 
The deposition of Victor Dorman was ordered pub-
lished, and a part thereof is as follows: That he was 
present on July 26, 1955, when a truckload of cheese 
wa:-: picketed at Dormans in ~ew York. (Tr. 264) That 
he does not recall having a conversation with either 
~[r. Rash or :.Mr. Lott, who did the picketing; that he 
had a conversation with .:\lr. Ristuccia; that Ristuccia is 
the President of Local 277. ( Tr. 265) That witness 
stated to Jlr. Ristuccia that the boys do not want to 
unload the truck without your permission to which Mr. 
Ri :-'tneeia replied, "I will let you know in a little while." 
That the wjtnes8 did not hear further from Ristuccia; 
that in the afternoon of the same day ~fr. Ristuccia stated 
that he said he did not stop the n1an frOin unloading 
the truck. (Tr. 266) 
~\_n objection wa~ made to the testimony which was 
~ustained, but the testi1nony was not stricken: that wit-
ne~~ ~ta.ted that he then ordered the truck be unloaded, 
which was done. (Tr. 270) That a later time a conver-
~a tion \Ya~ had with 1I r. Rash in Jir. Ristuccia's office, 
at ,,·hieh time the "'itness and his brother, Rash .. Ristuc-
<·in and ma~·be .Jlr. Ballew were present. That at that 
timP ~I r. Rash requested they cooperate so they could 
bring prP~~ure on Caelw Valley to join the Union; that 
wit nP~~ did what he could to get the1n to join the Union. 
(Tr. :271) r_ehat they sug·g·ested that the Dorn1ans get 
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their supplies elsewhere; that they said they would picket 
the Dorman establishment and showed a picket sign; 
that the brother of the witness asked if it was legal, and 
~Ir. Rash replied that he would take his chances; that 
witness wanted his employees to unload the cheese and 
did not tell them not to unload the same. (Tr. 272) 
Over objection of defendants the witness was per-
mitted to testify that the shipment .about which he tes-
tified came on a Mid-States truck rather than the Cache 
Valley Dairy Association truck because of the difficulty 
had with the truck in July; that the Dormans were com-
pletely unionized and the Mid-States .and other common 
carriers were unionized and witness did not wish any 
difficulties ; that the Dormans have continued to receive 
cheese from Cache Valley Dairy Association. (Tr. 273) 
Additional pictures were offered and received in 
evidence showing the signs used in picketing. (Tr. 274~ 
275) That about one-h.alf of the cheese received by the 
Dormans prior to July :25, 1956, was received in Dairy 
Distributor trucks; that cheese received by common car-
rier came in mechanically refrigerated trucks; that cheese 
is perishable and should be kept at a temperature of 35 
to 40 degrees. (Tr. 277) That the Cache Valley trucks 
were not mechanically refrigerated to the best of the 
knowledge of witness. (Tr. 278) That witness believes 
that cheese should be transported in vehicles which have 
devices for automatic temperature control. (Tr. 279) 
That witness had come to the conclusion that the best 
way to receive the cheese from Smithfield was to haul 
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the same in trucks owned and controlled by the Dormans. 
( Tr. 281) Witness does not believe any of the trucks 
used by Dairy Distributors to haul cheese to New York 
were Inechanically refrigerated. (Tr. 285) Witness has 
known Mr. Gossner for about ten years; that Mr. Gossner 
is the Manager of Cache Valley Dairy Association, and 
the Chief Executive officer of Dairy Distributors. (Tr. 
288) With few exceptions dealings were had with :Mr. 
Gossner; that Dorm.ans do not have a written contract 
with Dairy Distributors or with Cache Valley Dairy 
,Association; that the Dormans began doing business with 
Cache Valley Dairy Association in about 1946; that gen-
erally such business was done by ~Ir. Gossner, but busi-
ness had been done by Leland Seely. (Tr. 289) That 
Dormans were billed by Dairy Dstributors for the cheese.· 
( Tr. 290) That at times both Cache Valley and Dairy Dis~ 
tributors would bill Dormans for cheese, and the check 
would be made out to whoever billed Dormans. (Tr. 291) 
Then when cheese was ordered through Mr. Gossner he 
was never told whether the order was for Cache Valley 
or Dairy Distributors. (Tr. 292) That at time the pay-
Inent for the cheese was f.o.b. ~ew York, and at times 
payment was 1nade at Snrithfield. (Tr. 294) That when 
paytnents were n1ade it usually included transportation 
charges; that when bills were received for cheese shipped 
by connnon carrier it usually did not include transporta-
tion charges: that son1e transportation was in the Dor-
Inans' own trueks: that when shipped by Mid-States 
the transportation charges were paid by the shipper. 
(Tr. 295) That witness told ~[r. Gossner he wished 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
they would join the Union as they did not want trouble; 
that conversation along that line was had on many occa-
sions; that the truck that came to Donnans on July 26th 
was unloaded by union drivers. (Tr. 297) That every 
truckload of cheese brought by Dairy Distributors to 
Dormans was unloaded: that the one that came on 
July 26th was unloaded the same day at 5:00 o'clock; 
that every truckload of cheese from Cache Valley to 
Dormans was unloaded. (Tr. 298) That if D.airy Dis-
tributors landed a truckload of cheese at Dorman's dock 
this afternoon or at any time, the Dormans would prob-
ably be willing to accept the same ; that there was a 
mutual consent between Mr. Gossner and the Dormans 
after the first picketing that it would be best to have 
the cheese picked up by a union common carrier and 
brought to Dormans by that union common carrier, and 
Dormans being fully unionized there would be no re-
course so far as Dormans were concerned about taking 
cheese through non-union channels; that by doing this 
the possibility of picketing again would be eliminated. 
(Tr. 299) That witness preferred mechanically refrig-
erated trucks for hauling cheese, but would not say that 
the use of dry ice is totally useless. (Tr. 300) Witness 
did not tell Mr. Gossner to go out of the transportation 
business; that if witness called Mr. Gossner for a truck-
load of cheese, he would accept the same no matter how 
it was transported. (Tr. 301) 
Joseph W. Ballew w.as called by defendants, and 
in part testified as follows : 
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That he first visited New York over the :Memorial 
Day weekend of 1955; that he went to New York to see 
the Dormans and to prevail upon them to buy their 
cheese elsewhere. (Tr. 302) Witness met 1\Ir. Dorman 
twice. (Tr. 303) That he met the Dormans on July 26th 
and again on July 27th; that he is acquainted with Mr. 
Gossner and has been since April or Jlay of 1955. (Tr. 
304) Witness was familiar with the wages paid em-
ployees of cheese plants in the same competitive area 
as the plant operated by Gossner, and the wages paid 
at the Gossner operated plant were lower than wages 
paid for similar work in the same competitive area. (Tr. 
306) Witness was present at the Ben Lomon Hotel in 
Ogden, Utah, on August lOth at which .Jfr. Gossner, Mr. 
Thoresen, ~ir. Rash and Reid Neilson ·were present; 
that they began by discussing a duplicate contract. Mr. 
Thoresen said they were not meeting to negotiate a con-
tract, but to ascertain what the situation looked like. 
(Tr. 307) Mr. Thoresen said he desired to look over 
the proposed contract, and a meeting could be had on 
the following Wednesday, and he would haYe a counter 
proposal; that later ~fr. Thoresen and .Jir. Gossner in-
formed witness that there would be no further meeting; 
that on the following Septe1nber 6th a n1eeting was had 
at which witness, .Jlr. Thoresen .and .Jir. Skolnick, rep-
resenting the ~ational Labor Relations Board, :Jfr. ~eil­
~on, l\1 r. Rash and .Mr. Beck were present; that witness 
and his a~~oeiates ~tated they were willing and prepared 
to consent to an election which had been requested by 
~I r. Uo~~nPr in a filing before the Labor Board. (Tr. 
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308-309) .Mr. Thoresen stated it was not necessary to 
have an election of the employees of the Dairy Distribu-
tors because there were only two such employees, and 
that the Dairy Distributors were going out of business; 
that the meeting broke up and :Mr. Gossner withdrew his 
petition for .an election. (Tr. 310) That no election was 
held. (Tr. 311) That Exhibit 12 is the proposed contract 
presented to JI r. Gossner in New York and to ~fr. rrhore-
sen at the Ben Lomond on August 10, 1955. (Tr. 317) 
LeRoy Schenk was recalled and testified in part as 
follows: That on June :22, 1953, witness informed .Mr. 
Hansen that the Dormans had told witness to inforrn 
:.Mr. Gossner not to send any rnore cheese by the trailer 
because it couldn't be kept cool enough. (Tr. 324-5) 
Witness told .Mr. Hansen a dozen times that the cheese 
was arriving too warrn; that he told Mr. Gossner only 
once or twice that the cheese was arriving too warm. 
(Tr. 325) Stanley Forte was transporting cheese at 
the same time that witness was hauling cheese to New 
York. ( Tr. 326) That in hauling cheese to New York 
the trucks were usually iced three times; that it took 
about 30 minutes to ice the trucks. (Tr. 327) 
Clarence Lott was called by defendants and in part 
testified in substance as follows: That he is the Secre-
tary-Treasurer of r:eeamsters Local 983 at Pocatello, 
Idaho; that he is Vice President of .Joint Council 67. 
(Tr. 329) That witness first became aequainted with 
the Cache Valley area in 1929; that he is acquainted 
with Mr. Gossner. (Tr. 330) Witness stated he was 
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familiar \vith the cheese plants operated in northern 
Utah and southern Idaho, and was then asked if the 
wages paid at such plants were higher than the wages 
paid at the plant operated by Mr. Gossner, to which 
inquiry plaintiff objected, and the objection was sus-
tained. (Tr. 331-332) That defendants offered to show 
that the members of the Teamsters Union worked at a 
number of plants in southern Idaho where cheese was 
1nanufactured, and that the wages at the plant operated 
hy fi-ossner were substantially lower than the wages paid 
at the other plants: that such evidence was offered to 
refute the testimony of Mr. Thoresen when he testified 
that the reason the Gossner plant refused to bargain 
was because the Gossner plant paid higher wages than 
other plants in the contiguous territory. 
An objection was made to the offer and the same 
was by the Court sustained. (Tr. 334) 
A deposition of Louis Dorman was ordered pub-
lished, and the substance of the following portion there-
of received in evidence: That if a load of cheese were 
brought fron1 the Cache Valley plant either by Dairy 
Di ~tributors or con1mon carrier, truck or rail, Dormans 
would accept the sa1ne. (Tr. 336-7) 
On cross examination witness testified that ~Ir. Ris-
tuccia called witness to his office and introduced him 
to 1\ir. Rash and l\[r. Ballew where witness was told 
Mr. 0 o~sner was not cooperating with then1, and that 
thr~r would like it if the Dormans would not take their 
('h<'P~P; that witness said that the taking of the cheese 
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was of great importance to the Dormans, and that they 
couldn't very well just lie down and refuse to take the 
cheese; that Mr. Ristuccia said there was some under-
standing between different locals and one tries to co-
operate with another, and that he felt he should co-
operate with this western local, .and witness would just 
have to refuse to take the cheese; that witness said he 
just couldn't take that lying down, and that he would go 
through with it. (Tr. 337 -8) That Ristuccia said he 
would picket and showed the witness the pickets; that 
after the conversation the picket appeared. (Tr. 338) 
Plaintiff was permitted to reopen the case. 
Exhibit P-4 was received in evidence over the objec-
tion of plaintiff. (Tr. 338) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-16 was received in evidence 
with the adn1ission that if the auditor was called he 
would testify that the same was .an audit of the checks 
and books of plaintiff, but defendants objected to its 
competency. 
The Exhibit was received in evidence. (Tr. 339-40) 
Exhibit D-19 was admitted in evidence. 
At the conclusion of the evidence defendants renewed 
the motion made at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence. 
(Tr. 343-4) The motion to dismiss the c.ase was denied. 
Defendants individually and separately objected and 
excepted to the refusal of the Court to give their Request 
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~ o. 1, for the reason and upon the ground that the evi-
dence fails to show defendants are liable. 
Defendants individually and separately objected and 
excepted to the refus.al of the Court to give Request No. 2, 
for the reason and upon the ground that the evidence 
shows that Cache Valley Dairy Association and th~ 
Dairy Distributors, Inc., plaintiff herein, were so inter-
woven, each with the other, that in effect the acts of one 
constituted the acts of all. 
Defendants objected and excepted to the failure and 
refusal of the Court to give Request No. 3, for the reason 
and upon the ground that said request accurately states 
the law applicable to this case. 
Defendants objected and excepted to the refusal of 
the Court to give Request X o. 4, for the reason and upon 
the ground that said request is a correct statement of 
the law~ and the Court gave no instruction which included 
the contention of Request No. 4. 
Defendants objected and excepted to Instruction ~o. 
:>. in that said instruction is a Inisstatement of the law. 
in that, it f.ails to include the provisions of Section 9-c 
of the' Taft-Hartley ~\rt: and also objected and excepted 
to the giYing of paragraph (e) of Instrw:;tion 5. in that, 
it is a mi~~bltPmPnt of law, and particularly that it fails 
to indude the prnYi~ions of Section 9-c of the Taft-
1-Iartley Act. 
I>t>l't>ndant~ scYt>rally and separately objected and 
<'X<'PJliPd to the giYing of Instruction No. 6, in that, 
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the evidence fails to show that he was the agent of 
any of the defendants herein, excepting defendant Local 
Union 976. 
Defendants and each of them separately objected to 
Instruction No. 9, in that, the evidence in this case con-
clusively shows that the damages which plaintiff seeks 
to recover were speculative, conjectural and uncertain in 
that it depended on a prospect of receiving profits in 
the future, and the evidence fails to show that there 
was a reasonable probabilily that any such profits would 
be realized. 
The jury brought in a verdict in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendants for the sum of $100,000.00. Judg-
ment was entered on the verdict. Thereafter defendants 
moved the Court to enter judgment in favor of defend-
ants and against plaintiff notwithstanding the verdict, 
which Motion was supported by an affidavit. The Motion 
was denied. 
Defendants also filed a motion for a new trial, 
which was likewise denied. 
This appeal is prosecuted from the judgment and 
the whole thereof. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
The points upon which defendants and appellants 
rely for the reversal of the judgment are as follows: 
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POINT I 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANTS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF LIABIL-
ITY REQUIRED BY THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS ACT, 1947, AS A BASIS FOR DAMAGES. 
A. Plaintiff bases its claim upon Section 303 of 
the Act. 
B. Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence showing 
inducement by the Union of neutral employees 
to engage in concerted action. 
(1) Any appeal by the Union was made only 
to the neutral employer and its supervisor. 
( 2) There is no evidence of any appeal by the 
Union to a neutral employee either before 
of during the picketing. 
( 3) The evidence conclusively shows that the 
neutral employees were influenced only by 
their employer. 
C. Plaintiff failed to show a Section 303(a)(2) 
object in defendants' picketing and other activ-
ities. 
D. Local 976, while not technically certified as the 
collective bargaining agent of Gossner's em-
ployees, enjoyed a Board recognized status at 
least sinillar thereto with all the rights and 
privileges which the ... \.ct gives to a certified 
union. 
E. Plaintiff failed to show an unlawful attempt 
by defendants to accomplish a Section 303(a) (1) 
object. 
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POINT II 
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS, PUR-
SUANT TO EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF SECTION 303 OF 
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, IS EXEMPT FROM SUIT. 
POINT III 
THE WESTERN ·CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS IS A 
STRANGER TO THIS CAUSE, NOT A PROPER PARTY AND 
NOT LIABLE. 
POINT IV 
THE INTERNATIONAL UNION IS A STRANGER TO 
THIS CAUSE, NOT LIABLE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
THE JOINT AND SEVERAL MOTIONS OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS, MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE 
OF PLAINTIFF, TO DIRECT THE JURY TO BRING IN A 
VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM, OR, 
IF THAT MAY NOT BE DONE, TO DISMISS THE ACTION. 
(Tr. 232) 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
THE JOINT AND SEVERAL MOTIONS OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS, MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL THE EVI-
DENCE, TO DIRECT THE JURY TO BRING IN A VERDICT 
FOR DEFENDANTS, OR, IF THAT MAY NOT BE DONE, 
TO DISMISS THE ACTION. (Tr. 342-4) 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO 
THE J-URY DEFENDANTS' REQUEST NO. 1 WHEREBY DE-
FENDANTS REQUESTED THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY TO BRING IN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFEND-
ANTS AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF NO ·CAUSE OF ACTION. 
(Tr. 28) 
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POINT VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ENTER A JUDGMENT FOR 
DEFENDANTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
POINT IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED IN REEFUSING 
TO TAKE THE CASE FROM THE JURY AND RENDER A 
JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THE EVI-
DENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
AT THE TIME AND TIMES COMPLAINED OF UNLAW-
FULLY ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AND 
MAY NOT RECOVER DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF THE 
ACTS COMPLAINED OF. 
POINT X. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
DEFENDANTS TO FILE THEIR MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT 
OF DEAN T. CORBETT IN SUPPORT THEREOF TO RE-
LIEVE DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM, OF THE 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THEM, AND REFUSING TO GRANT 
SUCH MOTION. 
POINT XI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING AN OB-
JE.CTION TO THE TESTIMONY OFFERED BY THEIR WIT-
NESS, CLARENCE LOTT, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 
WAGES PAID AT THE CACHE VALLEY PLANT WERE 
LESS THAN THAT PAID IN ADJOINING TERRITORY. (Tr. 
331) 
POINT XII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING, OVER 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION, THE ADMISSION IN EVI-
DENCE OF EXHIBIT P-4. (Tr. 338) 
POINT XIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S EXHIBIT P-16 TO BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE 
(Tr. 339) 
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POINT XIV. 
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANTS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF LIABIL-
ITY REQUIRED BY THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS ACT, 1947, AS A BASIS FOR DAMAGES. 
A. Plaintiff bases its claim upon Section 303 of the 
Act. 
When plaintiff conunenced this action, it appears 
that a common law action was contemplated. It was 
filed in a state court; there was no reference, either 
directly or indirectly, to the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act; there were certain defendants included which 
the L.M.R.A. would not permit; punitive damages were 
requested; and its basis rests upon the common law 
doctrine of conspiracy. During a hearing on a rnotion 
to dismiss the .action, plaintiff's counsel changed their 
theory and announced that they would henceforth rely 
upon the L.M.R.A. (otherwise referred to herein as the 
Taft-Hartley Act, the Taft Act, or Act). 
Plaintiff, then, bases its claim on Section 303 of 
the L.11.R.A., the introductory part of which rPad~: 
"It shall be unlawful for the purpose of this 
section only, in an industry or activity affecting 
commerce, for .any labor organization to <mgage 
45 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in, or to induce or encourage, the employees of 
any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted 
refusal in the course of their employment to use, 
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise 
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, 
or commodities or to perform any services where 
an object thereof is-" LR.X 3770. 
This section is identical with Section 8(b) (4), the 
difference being that Section 8 describes unfair labor 
practices and Section 303 gives the basis for an action in 
damages. The part above quoted is the beginning of 
a sentence which relates equally to four separate parts 
of the sa1ne sentenc-e which follow, each of which parts 
states a particular object which is proscribed if pur-
sued by the unlawful means described in the part quoted. 
It appears from the instructions requested by plaintiff 
and the instructions given by the Court that defendants 
are being accused of using unlawful means to accomplish 
the two objects described in Sections 303(a)(l) and 
303 (a) ( 2). Defendants deny that they have used unlaw-
ful 1neans to accomplish any object and admit only the 
pursuance of the object described in Section 303(a) (1). 
The discussion on the subject of liability will first deal 
with the unlawful n1eans aspect. then with the objects. 
B. Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence showing 
inducement by the Union of neutral employees to engage 
in concerted action. 
(1.) Au apJJCal by the U·nion was made only to the 
neutral Pmployer and it~ superYisor. 
There i~ 1nuch evidence to sl1ow that the defendants 
worked with Victor and Louis Donnan, of N. Dorman 
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,and Company, the neutral employer, and tried Ly fair 
persuasion to convince thmn that they should not buy 
cheese from Gossner. This type of economic friction is 
expressly perrnitted by the National Labor Relations 
Board and the courts, and the privilege extends to induc-
ing not only the employer but even an employer's super-
visor. Rabouin, dba Conway's Express vs. N.L.R.B., 29 
L.R.R.M. 2617. The only person other than the Donnan 
Brothers which defendant, Joint Council G7, contacted 
directly during the picketing w.as Harry Rosen, a super-
visor of Dorman, and this consisted of a brief conver-
sation during the picketing. The trial court refused to 
instruct the jury that Rosen was a supervisor and was 
not a Taft Act employee. In fact, the court wouldn't even 
let the jury decide this matter under appropriate in-
structions involving the Taft Act definition of .an "ern-
ployee.'' 
Section 2 ( 3) of the Act says: 
"The term employee ... shall not include ... 
any individual employed as a supervisor.'' 
At Tr. 130, we read, from Mr. Rosen's testimony: 
'' Q. Your position there is foreman'? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Do you supervise the loading and unloading 
of merchandise in and out of your place~ 
A. True." 
And at Tr. 136, Rosen adds that he was supervisor 
of Nigro, an employee of Dorman and Company. Since 
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Rosen was a supervisor, he, by virtue of the above defi-
nition, necessarily is not a Taft-Hartley Act ''employee." 
(2.) There was no eviJdence of any appeal by the 
Unio11 to induce to concerted action a neutral employee 
either before or during the picketing. 
lnducen1ent to "concerted refusal" certainly neces-
sarily implies an induce1nent of more than one employee 
to join forces and concertedly refuse. Evidence of the 
picketing of a truck in the Y1ci·n1t~,~ of Dorman's entrance 
without showing what the inducement consisted of and 
a further showing of the particular or approximate num-
ber of unloaders who were or even might have been 
influenced thereby is not enough evidence to get by this 
requiren1ent of the statute. 
~~--· 
~ igro, the only en1ployee referred to in all the evi- j::~-
dence and then only incidentally. alone cannot satisfy 
this require1nent. In the X .L.R.B. Ys. International Rice 
~Iilling Co. case (341 C.S. 665, 28 L.R.R.~I. :2105), the 
l ;, N. Supre1ne Court said that a Union's picketing and 
Pncouragement of two en1ployees of a neutral employer 
did not mnount to an inducmnent to concerted activity. 
l s it not significant that there is not one bit of 
t P~t i mony in the entire record that the Dor1nan em-
plo~·pps wPn' called together collectively or individually Ita 
for the purpos<> of being induced, influenc-ed or encour- ~ 
ag-Pd to avoid handling the Gossner cheese f And is it :~ 
not further significant that not one single employee ~ 
ol' Dorman was called to testify either at the trial, or in _ ~r 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the form of deposition, or otherwise to tell of any such 
inducement? And is it not strange that no one was called 
to testify as an employee to say whether he saw the 
picket and to say what, if any, influence it had upon him? 
":-ithout such evidence we rnust conclude that the union 
not only didn't induce an employee before the picketing, 
but also did not influence an employee during the pick-
eting. 
The only person who did testify for plaintiff con-
cerning the influence the picketing had, was Harry Rosen, 
the supervisor. He had no advance knowledge of the 
picketing for it came as a total surprise to him. (Tr. 134-
136) And it is re.asonable to suppose that as a union 
member, even though a supervisor, Rosen would have 
been aware of any advance effort by the Union to induce 
the neutral employees to refuse to handle the Gossner 
cheese. 
Thus, it is conclusive from the record that there is 
no evidence whatsoever of any inducement of Dorman's 
employees either before or during the picketing. 
(3.) The evidence conclusively shows that the neu-
tral employees were ~nfluenced solely by their employer. 
If we assume that there were employees of N. Dor-
man and Company who saw the picket signs (and the 
record is such that we are left with only an assumption 
of such a fact), Rosen's testimony absolutely negates 
the idea that the employees were influenced by it. The 
only re.ason given for not unloading the truck on the 
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Inorning of July 26 was that the neutral en1ployer, the 
two Dormans, and the supervisor, Rosen, decided not to 
unload. When Rosen saw the picket signs and talked 
with Rash and for the first time learned that there was 
labor trouble, he did not discuss the matter or concert 
with Donnan's employees. (Tr. 131) His first thought, 
it appears, was to talk to his union official who was not 
available. So he made contact with the Dorman brothers, 
apparently either to tell them of the picketing, or to get 
instructions, or both. Then Rosen says that the Dormans 
and he, Rosen, decided not to unload. (Tr. 132, l. 16-18j. 
Where is there concert of action among employees here 1 
There is no evidence at all to indicate that an employee 
was influenced by the picketing, or that, as a result 
thereof, an e1nployee asserted hin1self in the slightest 
degree, or that employees influenced the Dorman deci-
sion not to unload. 'Yithout such evidenc€ there is no 
basis whatsoever for this case to be submitted to a 
jury for it to decide if there was any Taft ... \ct liability. 
It is obvious that the decisions were all being made 
by the e1nployer without any influence from his em-
ployees. In fact, fron1 Rosen's testmony, it appears that 
the employers were not even influenced by Rosen, the 
supervisor. The e1nployer n1ade the decisions and the 
en1plo~Tee~, if there were any, abided by them. 
Having discovered that it was the employer's de-
cision and order not to unload the truck, we now ask, 
who controlled and influenced the unloading of the truck1 
\"idor Donnan, after learning that he w.as in error in 
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thinking that the New York local business agent had told 
Dorman employees not to unload, then ''instructed the 
loader and my men to unload the truck, and we ordered 
it back from the parking lot to our front door .and 
unloaded it." (Tr. 267, l. 7-9) 
Thus, if there were neutral employees it is plain 
that they had not concerted, and had no influence at all 
upon the decision to unload or not to unload. That de-
cision was exclusively made by the employers, Victor 
and Louis Dorman. They and only they decided what 
was done and what was not done by the Dorman 
employees. Such employees expressed no opinion and 
exercised no discretion, except to follow subserviently the 
instructions of their bosses. For this reason - and 
this we emphasize - the truck was unloaded precisely 
when and as the employer ordered it unloaded. The 
slight delay in the unloading of the truck was caused 
solely by the picketing's direct influence upon the em-
ployer. The employees- if there were any at the time 
of the picketing - felt nothing, said nothing, and did 
nothing except as their ernployer told them. The moment 
the employer told them to unload the cheese, they un-
loaded it. 
It is, therefore, conclusive that the plaintiff has 
failed completely to show any concerted refusal to act 
among employees of Dorman and Company. Actually 
there is nothing in the record that even establishes that 
one employee was even aware of the picketing. Indeed, 
the record conclusively proves that if a neutral employee 
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had been aware of the picketing it necessarily had no 
effect or influence upon him and that the only thing that 
did influence any such employee was the en1ployer him-
self, upon whose orders he quickly responded and fol-
lowed to the letter. ~ow, regardless of what else plain-
tiff can prove in this case as to objects or any other 
element pointing to liability, his case is lost without the 
foundation of proof as to concerted refusal of employees 
to act, for influencing neutral employees to concerted 
refusal to handle the Gossner cheese is the foundation, 
and an absolute pre-requisite, for all else that the Act 
requires as a basis for an action in damages. 
C. Plaintiff failed to show a Section 303(a) (2) object 
in defendants' picketing and other activities. 
By raising the issue of certification in the instruc-
tions to the jury, the trial court necessarily implies that 
there was evidence that an object of the picketing was 
to force Gossner to recognize Local 976 as the bargaining 
agent for his employees. In other words, defendants are 
accused to having a 303(a) (2) object. There is, in fact, 
no evidence whatsover that defendants had a 303(a)(2) 
object. 
Actually, plaintiff alleges and proves only one ob-
ject: that of persuading Dorn1an and Company not to 
do busines~ with Gos~ner, which is a 303(a) (1) object. 
But a~ argued in other places herein, that object was 
pnr~uPd by lawful n1e,an~ and thus the object itself is 
la.,vful. 'Ve again e1nphasize that Section 303 objects 
arP unlawful only as the 1neans used to attain the objects 
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are unlawful. Defendants admit, and the evidence clearly 
shows, that the object was to get Dorman and Company 
either to persuade Gossner to bargain as to wages, hours, 
and other conditions of employment, or to cease doing 
business with Gossner. But even if plaintiff had pro-
duced evidence of unlawful means jn attaining an~~ object, 
he has, nevertheless, failed to produce any evidence of 
a 303(a) (2) object, for there is no evidence that an 
object of defendant's picketing and other activities was 
to force Gossner to recognize the union as the particular 
representative of the employees; and this is the only 
object which Section 303(a) (2) proscribes. The Union 
never felt it had a problem as to who Gossner should 
bargain with. The Board had already designated Local 
976 as the bargaining agent. But regardless of this fact 
Gossner simply wouldn't bargain. He wouldn't bargain 
with .anyone. Prior to the picketing, in fact prior to 
August 10, 1955, it never occurred to the Union that 
there was a question as to who should bargain with 
Gossner. It was not until the parties met at the Ben 
Lomond Hotel August 10 - two weeks after the picket-
ing- that Local 976 was advised that Thoresen did not 
consider the Union the bargaining representative of 
Gossner's employees. (Even then Thoresen received the 
union's proposed contract and said he would submit a 
counter proposal.) But such oral or written advice 
is without effect or merit. Such thoughts must be 
entertained in good faith and have a basis in lawful 
procedure set up by the Act. If Thoresen or Oo~~nPr 
truly believed what they belatedly asserted, they could 
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and should have petitioned the Board for an election as 
to who did represent the employees. "Whether or not 
the Union has lost that status is for the Board to deter-
Inine upon orderly statutory procedure." (N.L.R.B. vs. 
Sanson l-Iosiery :Mills, 5 Cir., 1952, 195 F2d 350, 353-354, 
29 L.ll.R.~1. 2663.) 
Since an object ·of the union is the problem involved, 
we are dealing with the purpose and intent and condi-
tion of Inind of union officials 2-nd not that of Mr. 
Gossner or ~lr. Thoresen. X ow, as to this, what is the 
evidence as to what the Union officials were thinking 
as to who represented the employees! 
.Mr. Rash, a witness for the plaintiff and the Secre-
tai·y-Treasurer of Local 976 and an officer of J. C. 67, 
said that when he went to X ew York, Local 976 was the 
duly authorized agent for the employees. (Tr. 115, I. 2-4) 
l{e sa~·s further that Gossner met with the union offi-
('ials but never bargained with them. (Tr. 115, I. 17-19) 
Al:-:o, Rash's Inind-set or condition of mind, as to rep-
resentation rested confidently in the security of a Board 
Order (.Jiarch 4, 1953, 31 L.R.R.M. 1551) requiring Goss-
lll'l' to reeognize the Union as the bargaining agent. 
Cl,r. 1 Hi, I. :2-G) He was also satisfied that the union 
J'('Jll'l'~Pnted the en1ployees as a result of their position 
a~ bargaining agt>nt in .a contract which 1nay have been 
tel'lllinatt>d, but which tennination had not changed the 
union'~ n'prP~l'ntation position. (Tr. 116, I. 26-30: Tr. 
119, I. 1-7) 
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This is the only positive evidence on the problen1. 
There is nothing in the record that controverts Mr. 
Rash's testimony on this point, and he was plaintiff's 
witness. 
All that :Mr. Gossner himself contributes to the mat-
ter is this: 
"\Ve signed a contr.act with them years ago. 
In 1946 we were threatened with boycott and I 
signed a contract and kept a signed contract until 
1951 or 1952, until they demanded a great big 
increase. We said we couldn't give thein an in-
crease and since then no contract w.as signed, and 
evidently that is where that ended.'' ( Tr. 76, l. 
14-25.) 
So Mr. Gossner really contributes nothing either 
one way or the other. Certainly there is no evidence here 
that even slightly negatives the union's understanding 
on representation. 
Mr. Thoresen, another of plaintiff's witnesses, who 
was Mr. Gossner 's counsel as to labor rel.ations, says 
that following the Board Order to Gossner to negotiate 
with Local 976, the Board, in an effort to deterinine 
whether the Order was being complied with, wrote let-
ters to Mr. Thoresen asking for information as to its 
compliance and that after .a time the Board wrote him 
and said it was closing their file on that <'asP. ( 'rr. 179, 
l. 19-30; Tr. 180, l. 1-3) rrhis appears to mean that the 
Board seemed satisfied that Uossner was bargaining 
with Local 976. Whether this was actually the case, as 
}fr. Rash denies (Tr. 179, l. 29-30; Tr. 180, I. 17-3), there 
55 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is nothing in all of this that even slightly indicates that 
Local 976 was no longer the bargaining agent and cer-
tainly there is nothing in this that shows an altering 
of the condition of Mr. Rash's mind on the subject of 
representation. 
Now we come to the particular incident which ap-
pears to have changed Mr. Thoresen's mind as to who 
represented the employees. On p. 180, I. 12-17, Mr. 
Thoresen ~ay~ ).Ir. Rash sent an open letter to Mr. 
Uos:'ner's e1nployees in ·which they \\-ere informed that 
they were suspended from the union because of their 
failure to do their part in a fight for a contract sub-
Initted by the union. "~lfter that," says ).Ir. Thoresen, 
I didn't bargain with ~Ir. Rash" on account of this open 
letter, a copy of which letter had also been sent to ilr. 
Thoresen. 
\Yhile this indicates why )lr. Thoresen didn ~t bar-
agin with ).Ir. Rash, it in no way ternrinates the union's 
status as a bargaining representative of the en1ployees, 
nor doe~ it eYen suggest any connnunication of Thore-
sen's thinking to the union, nor of an altering of :Mr. 
Rash'~ 1nind on the union\;;; established status of bar-
gaining agent for the en1ployee:s. 
_Although tlw Board Order of March 4, 1953 had 
result('d in son1e negotiations. no agreen1ent was reached 
and tltP bargaining parties appear to haYe been content 
to maintain a ~tatus quo and wait for a better bargain-
ing elimaJP. At least there was .an inartiYe period as to 
bargaining for about two ~-ears during which the union 
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made no demands. (Tr. 189, I. 14-27) But it is impor-
tant to note that t was a status quo situation. There is 
no evidence, whatsoever, that during this time there was 
any question in any union official's mind as to the 
union's right to represent the employees in bargaining 
for them. X or during this time is there the slightest 
evidence showing that Gossner or Thoresen notified the 
Union that they even thought the Union did not represent 
the employees. The first such notification cmne August 
10 .at the Ben Lonwnd. This was more than two weeks 
following the picketing. 
Thus, there is nothing at all in the record to warrant 
an instruction to the jury as to a 303(a) (2) object 
because there is absolutely no evidence that an object 
or purpose thereof was to get Gossner to recognize the 
union as the employees' representative for barg.aining 
purposes. We reiterate, the union was never aware of 
any problem as to who Gossner should bargain with. 
Gaining recognition was not a problem. The real problem 
which the union had was to get Gossner to bargain even 
though its bargaining position was established. (See 
Cache Valley Dairy Assn., supra.) 
D. Local 976, while not technically certified as the col-
lective bargaining agent of Gossner's employees, enjoyed 
a Board recognized status at least similar thereto with all 
the rights and privileges which the Act gives to a certified 
union. 
In our analysis of 303(a) (2) of the Act, we have 
seen that since there is no evidence as to the p.articular 
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object called for in 303(a) (2) there is no point in con-
sidering the balance of 303 (a) ( 2), which has to do with 
certification. This is because the part of 303(a) (2) 
having to do with certification has no application unless 
there is some evidence of a 303(a) (2) object. Since 
there is, indeed, no such evidence of a 303(a) (2) object, 
it should not be necessary to argue our case against a 
303(a) (2) liability any further. But in view of Ju~y 
Instructions ~o. 2(b) 5-l(b), and 5(d), it appears essen-
tial to proceed under the invalid assumption that there 
was evidence that the Union did have a 303(a) (2) object 
in mind when it picketed. So we proceed under this 
unfortunate assumption. 
If there were evidence of such object there would 
still be no cause of action under 303(a)(2) if "such labor 
organization has been certified as the representative of 
such e1nployees under provision of Section 9 of the 
~.L.R.A.'' 
In other words, even if it could be shown that there 
had been a violation by the Union of 8(b) (-!)(B) or its 
counterpart, Section 303(a) (:.?).there would be a defense 
to such conduct if the Union were certified, or-we will 
add and prove fron1 Section 9-if the Union enjoyed a 
position of ~i1nilar standing to that of being certified, 
and we intend hereinafter also to show that the Union 
did, indeed, enjoy such sinular standing. 
In passing, we Inake this nnportant observation: 
~in<'P t lwrP wa~ error, because there was no foundation 
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in the evidence, and therefore not an issue in this case, 
to give an instruction as to a 303(.a) (2) object, defend-
ants were especially imposed upon by being prevented 
from arguing to the jury the effect that Section 9 had 
in qualifying Section 303 (a) ( 2) as applied to the facts 
of this case relative to the defense it gave defendants, 
for the trial judge, in quoting Section 303 (a) ( 2) as part 
of the instructions to the jury, omitted the words, ''under 
the provisions of Section 9 of the N.L.R.A., '' a very 
necessary and vital qualification of Section 303(a) (2). 
We now propose to show by a brief study of Section 
9 that Local 976 enjoyed the protection of the defense 
provided by the Act for certified unions. 
Section 9 is the Section which lays down the rules 
governing the selection of the bargaining representative 
of the employees. A careful reading of Section 9 dis-
closes a primary purpose thereof to be the protection of 
employees from unions which the employees do not want 
to represent them and the protection of employees and 
employer from a contest between rival unions for the 
right to represent the employees in bargaining. Thus, 
to use an example suggested by 8 (d) of the Act itself, 
if, after a reasonable period of time, the employees wish 
to replace the union which has been representing them, 
with a second union, the second union c.annot replace the 
first union and cannot even attempt to do so in the 
manner proscribed by 303(a)(2) in order to be free of 
liability, unless it-the second union-is certified. Thus, 
whether the first union attained its bargaining status by 
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voluntary agreement of all parties concerned or by 
petition, investigation, hearing, election, and finally 
Board certification, the Act protects the first union in its 
bargaining representative position until the second union 
has petitioned and proven by an election called by the 
Board that it should replace the first union. The first 
union is protected during all the Board procedures and 
right up to the time the second union succeeds in being 
certified. So it is also where the contest is between an 
employer and a union which has been enjoying recog-
nition, and no other union is challenging that status. 
~.L.R.B. vs. Sanson Hosiery :Jfills, supra. Thus, the de-
sirable thing for any union is to obtain and enjoy the 
status of the bargaining agent, howsoever they come 
by it, because thereafter the burden of proving otherwise 
is upon a formal petitioner! And nothing short of a 
formal petition by an employee concerned, or by the 
employer will even begin to upset that status. 
But just wanting to upset the status of a recognized 
union is not enough. X or is it enough for an employer 
to notify a union, which has been enjoying the bargaining 
representative status, that the mnployer no longer looks 
upon the union as the en1ployee 's bargaining agent. 
All this is governed by Section 9, which in turn is 
incorporated into 303(a) (~). 
Section 9 (a) in part reads : 
• ·Representatives designated or selected for 
the purpose of collective bargaining by the ma-
jority of the employees in a unit appropriate for 
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such purposes, shall be the exclusive representa-
tives of all the employees in such unit for the 
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to 
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or to 
other conditions of employment. ... "LRX 3757 
And Section 9 (c) ( 1) reads: 
"9(c) (1) Whenever a petition shall have been 
filed, in accordance with ~ueh regulations as may 
be prescribed by the Board-
" (A) By an employee or group of employees 
or any individual or labor organization acting in 
their behalf alleging that a substantial nun1ber of 
employees (i) wish to be represented for collec-
tive bargaining and that their employer declines 
to recognize their representative as the represen-
tative defined in Section 9(a), or (ii) assert that 
the individual or labor org.anization, which has 
been certifi'erl OR is being currentlyy recognized 
by their employer as the bargaining representa-
tive, is no longer a representative as defined in 
Section 9(a); or 
"(B) by an employer, alleging that one or 
more individuals or labor organizations h.ave pre-
sented to him a claim to be recognized as the 
representative defined in Section 9 (a) ; the Board 
shall investigate such petition and if it has reason-
able cause to bel~eve that a question of represen-
tatiJon affecting commerce exists shall provide for 
an appropriate hearing UpOn due notice. o):o 'Xo >X< 
If the Board finds upon the record of such a 
hearing that such a questvon of representation 
exists, it shall direct an election by sp(•rd ballot 
and shall certify the results thereof.'' (emphasis 
ours) LRX 3757-8 
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Thus, the Board is required only to investigate a 
petition and unless it finds fron1 the investigation that 
a question of representation exists it is not required to 
have a hearing. If a hearing is held, before it can call into 
play the n1achinery for an election, it must first find 
that there is, indeed, a question of representation. 
In the case before the Court, prior to the picketing 
no employee had petitioned for a change in repre-
::;entation. The employer had not petitioned the Board for 
a change. X o rival union had petitioned. So, we ask 
what possible reason would there be for the Union itself 
to petition for a bargaining status which it already en-
joyed and concerning which no one was complaining 
either by petition as provided by the Act or in any 
other way~ Furthermore, since the Board, before it called 
an election, 1nust first find that a question of representa-
tion existed, where under the facts of this record, could 
the Board find .a question of representation f \Vhy should 
the Board go to the expense and trouble of an election 
when no one is petitioning except the union which already 
has been, and is, enjoying the status of bargaining agenU 
But this is what plaintiff is demanding of defendants 
under penalty of drunage liability for their failure so 
to do. 
~rhese are faeets of this case wherein the jury was 
not i n:-:t ructed, in Yit'W of which please note the prejudice 
against the defendants which the following interrogation 
of 1\lr. Rash by .Mr. Rex Hanson engenders: 
"(~. And at the tune Yon went back to New York, 
is it your conten.tion No. 976 had been certi-
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fied by the N.L.R.B. as bargaining .agent for 
those en1ployees or nott 
A. We were recognized barg.aining agent by his 
signed contract before. 
Q. Had you been certified by the N.L.R.B. when 
you went back to X ew York? 
A. It wasn't necessary. 
Q. Answer 'yes' or 'no'. Had you been certified 
by the N.L.R.B. when you went back to Xew 
York on :May 31, 1955? 
A. No." (Tr. 118, l. 29-30; Tr. 110, l. 1-11) 
In view of the above, instruction 5 (d) is tantamount 
to direcUng a verdict of liability simply because Local 
976 was not certified. 
E. Plaintiff failed to show an unlawful attempt by 
defendants to accomplish a Section 303(a)(l) object. 
We come now to the error which we claim in the 
instructions as they relate to plaintiff's claim of liability 
arising out of 303(a) (1). The pertinent part of the 
303(.a) (1) object reads as follows: "(1) forcing or re-
quiring any employer o;~ * * to cease * * * doing business 
with any other persons.'' We admit that this was an 
object of the defendants. But we deny, and there is no 
evidence to prove, that this object was attempted by 
means of an inducement of Dorman's employees to en-
gage in a concerted refus.al to handle any goods, which 
has heretofore been argued. Even if the picketing had 
induced Dorman's employees to engage in a concerted 
refusal to handle the cheese, defendants clairn their t ra-
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ditional right to picket an ambulatory situs of their 
dispute with Gossner, and that the Trial Court fell into 
error by failing to instruct concerning the ambulatory 
aspPds of this case. Because of what we have said 
already about the lack of evidence showing inducement to 
concerted action we say that there is no basis to submit 
.an instruction as to liability under Section 303(a) (1) of 
the Ad. If, however, we assume that there were such 
eviden(·e, the jury instructions as to 303(a) (1) are still 
erroneous in what they lack or in their failure to give 
what should have been given concerning the ambulatory 
picketing aspect of this case. Indeed, as to this one 
phase alone, we believe we can show that if the Trial 
Court had given full consideration to the law concerning 
mnbulatory picketing, it would have seen the necessity 
of directing a verdict against the plaintiff because of 
plaintiff's failure to prove tllis part of his case. 
Essentiall~-. the only instructions the jury received 
as to 303(a) (1) ·was a mere reading of the act itself. 
The obvious inadequacy therein arises from the fact that 
this part of the ~\d. a~ written, has perplexed the best 
legaln1inds as to its 1neaning when applied to ambulatory 
picketing. The jury (and the defendants) are entitled 
to the benefit of court interpretations and explanations 
of th<' statntP ·~ 1neaning in an ambulatory picketing fact 
~ituation . 
. \ substantial part of Gassner's stock in trade-
<·IH'<'sP-was generally on wheels between Amalga, Utah ·1 ... :· 
and ~<'". York City-$15.000 worth on eYery truck load. 
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rrhere were two irnportant terminals: At Amalga where 
the cheese was produced and loaded on the trucks, and 
at Dorman's dock in New York City where the cheese 
was sold and delivered. Under such facts an important 
situs of Gossner's business was on wheels, and as a 
practical matter, wherever the truck, loaded with cheese, 
came to rest, that place became an important situs of 
Gassner's business. Must the Union under such facts, 
necessarily be restricted in any picketing .activity to the 
place only where the cheese is processed j? Or may the 
Union follow the finished product as it is loaded or 
unloaded and use either place, or wherever else the 
truck may go, to advertise its dispute 'J? These are ques-
tions, the answers to which are not spelled out in the 
Act. The answers have been supplied by the courts. 
And these court guides and helps were urged upon the 
Court in this c.ase. But, unfortunately, and in error, 
landmark cases, such as the Board's l\1:oore Dry Dock 
Case, 27 L.R.R.l\L 1108, the Board's Schultz Refrigera-
ted Service Case, 25 L.R.R.M. 1122, the Serivce Trade 
Chauffeurs Case, 191 F 2d 65, 28 L.R.R.M. 2450, the 
International Rice Milling Case, 341 U.S. 665, 28 
L.R.R.M. 2105, the Campbell Coal Case, 229 F 2d 514, 
37 L.R.R.M. 2166, and others, were completely ignored 
by the Court in the giving of the instructions, and the 
jury thereby failed to receive the benefit of what the 
law is in this field of difficult legal application. 
By failing to adequately instruct the jury, it is a 
necessary assumption that the jury may well have fallen 
into the very error to which the U .S. Second Circuit 
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Court of Appeals refers in the case of N.L.R.B. vs. 
Service Trades Chauffeurs, aupra. 
This was a case ''where the pnmary employer's 
businesl:;, travelling about on wheels, rolls up to the 
secondary employer's door or onto his premises." In 
fact and principle it is a case that is substantially the 
same as the case now before the Court. 
In considering the proble1n and after quoting from 
the International Rice ~filling Case, supra, the Court 
says, 
''We take this to mean that a union may 
lawfully inflict harm on a neutral employee, with-
out violating 8 (b) ( 4), [8 (b) ( 4) is identical with 
303(a) (1), the former relating to unfair labor 
practices, the latter relating to action for dam-
ages] so long as the hann is merely incidental to 
a traditionally lawful primary strike, conducted 
at the place where the primary employer does 
business. 
·• The trouble lies in deterulining what is 'in-
cidental' and 'pri1nary' in a case like this where 
the primary e1nployer 's business, travelling about 
on wheel~. rolls up to the secondary en1ployer's 
door or onto hi~ pren:tises .. , 
And it is here that the Court points out the par-
ticular danger above referred to : 
'•To hold that, in such circu1nstances, the 
union may not there piC'ket the primary en1ployer 
in any wa:y because the seC'ondary employer might 
thereby be injured would be virtually to deprive 
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the union of ,a powerful weapon which Congress 
meant to pre,serve. '' 
Having warned us of the danger, the court proceeds 
to give us the criteria by which we may be guided to 
legal safety. And what is the guide~ It's the criteria 
of the Sailor's Union Case (Moore Dry Dock) which 
the defendants submitted to the Trial Court in their 
proposed instructions but which were completely re-
jected. "If this picketing," says the Court, "met the 
criteria announced in the Sailor's Union Case, then it 
was not unlawful because employees of the secondary 
employers or employees of other employers, due to their 
habitual unwillingness to cross picket lines, refused to 
do so, for such effects are within the realm of the inci-
dental." 
The Moore Dry Dock criteria are very simple-four 
in number: 
1. "The picketing is strictly limited to times when 
the situs of dispute is located on the secondary em-
ployer's premises." Actually, the picketing was never 
really on Dorman's premises; it was in front of Dor-
man's property on a public street. But, 'of course, it 
was adjacent to Dorman's place of business and the 
only time pickets were in the vicinity of Dorman's was 
when the Gossner truck was present. The truck loaded 
with cheese was the situs of the dispute and it was the 
truck only that was picketed. Thus, there is absolutely 
no evidence showing a violation of this criterion by the 
defendants. 
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2. "At the time of the picketing the primary em-
ployer is engaged in its normal business at the situs." 
When the Gossner truck was in front of Dorman's and 
being picketed, Gossner's employee was there to, and in 
fact did, e:o.gage in Gossner's normal business of un-
loading cheese at that point. There is no evidence to 
the contrary. 
3. "The picketing is li1nited to places reasonably 
close to the location of the situs.'' The truck \Yas the 
situs. The only evidence on this point was that the 
picketing was always in the vicinity of the truck -no 
place else. ( Tr. 260, 261) 
4 .. The picketing discloses clearly that the dispute 
is with the primary employer." The picket signs plainly 
exclude Dorman from involvement in the dispute and 
('}early point to the source of the cheese, and specifically 
and solely involves as the disputant one of Gossner's 
business names : Cache Valley Dairy ~\ssociation. 
Thus, defendants meet eyery test. A careful analysis 
of ~i1nilar cases where it has held that secondary boy-
cott effects were not just incidental, and therefore un-
lawful, reveal that the picketing failed to meet one or 
nwre of the above eriteria. 
ThP Court (no le88 authority than a U.S. Court of 
AppPal~) ~a~·~ that .a1nbulatory picketing 1nay not be 
unlawful under Taft-1Iartley eYen when there may be a 
~peonda ry ho~·eott effeet including a concerted action 
nnwng ~<'eondar~· enlployet~8, and gives specific and 
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definite criteria by which we may determine when such 
efects are incidental. There is not one shred of evidence 
in this case that places the defendants or any of them 
beyond or outside the standards and limitations of these 
criteria. Therefore, he defendants are, by law, entitled 
to .a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
But if there were such evidence in the record, it 
was, even so, error of a most palpable nature for the 
Trial Court to refuse the giving of defendant's requested 
instructions of the Moore Dry Dock criteria, since they 
are the one and only legal standard by which the jury 
would be guided in determining whether there was in 
fact a 303(,a) (1) liability; or, on the other hand, whether 
it was lawful picketing and that whatever harm, if any, 
flowing therefrom was only incidental to the lawful 
picketing~ 
One other important observation relative to the 
purpose and spirit of the st.atutes under consideration. 
Congress undoubtedly was primarily concerned with 
damage suffered by innocent third parties (secondary 
employers) where there was an active dispute between 
primary employers and primary employees. The third 
party innocent byst.ander in this case is Dorman and 
Company. If it were injured, it is not complaining. And 
the protection intended for Dorman and Company i's 
now claimed by one for whom it was not intended-
even if Gossner, otherwise, could prove his case. 
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POINT II. 
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS, PUR-
SUANT TO EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF SECTION 303 OF 
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, IS EXEMPT FROM SUIT. 
The labor organization mentioned in Section 303(a) 
of the Act is defined in Section 2 ( 5) as follows : 
" ( 5) The term 'labor organization' means 
any organization of any kind, or any agency or 
employee representation comn1ittee or plan, in 
which employees particjpate and which exists for 
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, hours of en1ployment, or 
of conditions of work." 
It is a matter of very common knowledge, at least 
in the world of labor affairs, that the \V estern Confer-
ence of Teamsters was not organized for and does not 
exist for the purpose of collective bargaining. It is with-
out dispute whatsoever that the \Yestern Conference of 
Teamsters is not even a labor union. The dismissed 
defendant, Joseph \V. Ballew, was called by the plain-
tiff, which testimony is undisputed, and testified as 
follows: 
.. (~. 
. \. 
Q. 
A. 
~ o\\·, with re:::;pert to the \\~estern Conference 
of 1\)amster:::;. so called. do ~rou know whether 
or not that is a labor union f 
It isn't a labor union as such . 
\Vhat~ 
It isn't a labor union, as such. It doesn't 
negotiate or .anything of that nature." (Tr. 
149-50) 
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The dismissed defendant Rash was called by plain-
tiff and respecting which testimony there is no disptde, 
testified that the Western Conference of Teamsters is 
not a labor union, that he, Rash, has no control over the 
Western Conference of Teamsters and the \V estern Con-
ference of Teamsters has no control over him. ( Tr. 125) 
Hence, if theW estern Conference of Teamsters does 
not fall within the definition of Sub-Section 5 of Section 
2 of the L.~LR . .A. and there is no dispute in such behalf, 
therefore it is exempt and may not here be sued and its 
motion to dismiss should have been granted. 
POINT III. 
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS IS A 
STRANGER TO THIS CAUSE, NOT A PROPER PARTY AND 
NOT LIABLE. 
The summons in this cause was purportedly served 
upon the dismissed defendant, Joseph W. Ballew. 
The Western Conference of Teamsters hires no em-
ployees in Utah, it employs no employees in Utah, it 
has no principal office, branch ,sub-division or repre-
sentative in Utah - in short, the record discloses not 
one scintilla of evidence wherein the Western Confer-
ence of Teamsters is connected in anywise with this case; 
It took no action respecting the case or even knew about 
it or ever transacted or did any business in Utah since 
its organization. Joseph W. Ballew, a witness produced 
on the part of the plaintiff, whose testilllony is undis-
puted, testified as follows : 
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"Q. \Vill you state your name, please? 
A. Joseph W. Ballew. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Ballew? 
A. 18230 Evanston, Seattle, Washington. 
Q. How long have you lived there? 
A. Since approximately June of 1957. 
Q. This year? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. \Yill you state your business or occupation~ 
A. I am representative of the Western States 
Dairy Employees Council. 
Q. How long have you been employed in that 
capacityf 
A. It is over three years. 
Q. \Yere you e1nployed in that capacity in the 
year 1955 in Salt Lake City? 
A. Yes, sir." (Tr. 1-±1) 
Mr. Milo Y. Rash was called by the plaintiff and 
testified as follows: 
"Q. X ow. ~I r. Ra::-h. is the \Yes tern Conference 
of Tea1nsters a labor union~ 
A. X ot a::' such. no. 
Q. Do ~-ou hnYP any control over it~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. Dm's it have any control over you~ 
A. No sir. 
-q ,_ 
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Q. You stated to adversary counsel, Mr. Ballew 
accompanied you to New York. 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Was he on your payroll, 97 6? 
A. No sir. 
Q. How did you come to get Mr. Balle-w to go 
·with you to New York? 
A. _Mr. Balle\\' is an employee of Western Dair;: 
Employees and he was loaned to our local 
union under my direction to help in this 
matter. 
Q. He was working and whatever he did was 
exclusively under your jurisdiction? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And direction 1 
A. Yes sir." ( Tr. 125-6) 
The record showing no scope of employment and 
no agency respecting the vV estern Conference of Team-
sters and Mr. Ballew, but on the contrary showing con-
clusively that Mr. Ballew was the employee of the 
Western Dairy Council and that whatever work he did 
was under the exclusive direction and control of I\ I r. 
Rash, and that Mr. Rash had no control over the Western 
Conference of Teamsters and the Western Conference of 
Teamsters had no control over Mr. Rash, it would seent 
that any further comment on our part to the effect that 
the Western Conference of Teamsters is a stranger to 
this record, was wrongfully made a party herein and 
should have been dismissed, would be wholly unnecessary. 
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POINT IV. 
THE INTERNATIONAL UNION IS A STRANGER TO 
THIS CAUSE, NOT LIABLE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED. 
We here expressly invite the Court's attention to 
the fact that the record shows without dispute that only 
one defendant engaged in any picketing which \Yas, to 
wit: the defendant, Joint Council67. 
It is essential in this behalf that the defendant must 
conform to the fundamental rules of the agency which 
it asserts, the rules which control the determination of 
the responsibility of International Union for a breach 
of the Taft-Hartley Act, if any, on the part of the Joint 
Council. The burden of proof is cast on the plaintiff 
to prove the agency relationship both as to existence of 
the relationship and the nature and extent of the agent's 
authority; agency being a contractural relationship de-
riving from the consent of the principal and agent that 
the agent shall act for the principal; hence the scope of 
the agent·~ authority 1nust ah,·ays be shown by the party 
asserting such agency. 
As far back as the year 1920 in a decision written 
by Chief Justice Taft and argued before the Court by 
Charle~ Evan8 Hughes, United ]/hre Workers FS. Cor-
onado Coal Company, 66 Law ed 975-259 F.S. 34-1. it was 
specifically held that a national union cannot be held 
rP~ponsible for actiYity conducted by a local union unless 
the national union assu1nes f'xpr._:•ssly such responsibility. 
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There is not one iota of evidence in this record that 
the defendant International Union ever heard of or knew 
anything about this case. None of its officers, general 
or otherwise, participated in the picketing or the long 
negotiations which lead up to and induced the picketing. 
There is no evidence that the International has an author-
ized agent in r tah, general, special or otherwise. There 
is no evidence that the International has an office in 
rtah, general, special or otherwise. There is no evidence 
that it has ever fired, hired or employed any persons in 
any wise connected with this case to act for it in such 
behalf. There is no evidence that it has ever indicated 
any intention or paid out one cent respecting this case 
or that it has ever transacted any business in Utah, New 
York, or anywhere else in respect to this case or at all. 
Service of summons in this cause was purportedly 
made upon the defendant International Union by deliver-
ing a copy of same to the dismissed defendants, Joseph 
\V. Balle\v and Milo V. Rash. Motion to quash the service 
of such process was made but overruled. 
There is no dispute in the record respecting l\T r. 
Ballew's employer and by whom he was compensated. 
It was the Western Dairy Council. Nor is there any 
dispute in the record respecting the fact that Mr. Ballew 
was loaned to Local Union 976 and while so temporarily 
on loan, was under the immediate and exclusive control 
and direction of Mr. Rash, the secretary of said Local 
Union 976, presumably because such local union had a 
large dairy membership and paid per capita tax to Mr. 
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Ballew's employer, the Western Dairy Council. There is 
not the slightest evidence in the record that Mr. Ballew 
takes orders from, or is on the payroll of, or an agent 
of the International Union, or bears any connection, 
remote, direct or otherwise, with the International, except 
perhaps his membership status which, along with 
1,670,000 others, requires him to pay into his local union 
about thirty cents per capita per month to be in turn 
paid by his local union to the International Union at 
its headquarters in the City of Washington, D.C. 
:Mr. Rash is neither an elective officer of the Inter-
national, nor an appointed International representative, 
nor has he ever held himself out to be such. There is 
not even a hint in the record that the International 
could or did ever make a grant of authority to a local 
union officer to hold himself out as an officer of the 
International Union. ~Ir. Rash was called on the part of 
the plaintiff and testified: 
"Q. You hold 1nen1bership meetings, you pay your 
bills, and you collect your dues, and you nego-
tiate vour contract autonon1ousl~~ from your 
ow·n Local lTnion at headquarters in Ogden? 
A. Yes. 
Q. EverY contract signed is signed by the secre-
tary ~f the lTnion, by ~[ilo V. Rash Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the contracts had with Mr. Gossner back 
in 194 7 were signed by the secretary of the 
Union? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. .Mr. Annan's name was not on any of then11 
A. No. 
Q. How 1nuch is paid~ 
A. Forty cents per member per month. 
Q. And every Local Union in the United States, 
Canada, and Hawaii, and Puerto Rico and 
ever~'where else does the same~ 
A. Yes, no difference. 
Q. Like·wise you pay per capita tax into Western 
Dairy Council~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. John .JI. Annan, or nobody else, fixes those 
dues except the International which you de-
cide to pay in Ogden? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So far as you know, Local Union 976 is com-
pletely an autonomous organization~ 
A. Correct. 
Q. And is wholly independent of 227 In New 
York~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And wholly independent of Joint Council -4-:2 
in Los Angeles~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And wholly independent from any other 
organization~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. (By .Mr. Beck). Now, Mr. Rash, is the West-
ern Conference of Teamsters a Labor ( T nion? 
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A. Not as such, no. 
Q. Do you have any control over it~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. Does it have any control over YOU? 
A. No sir. 
Q. You stated to adversary counsel, Mr. Ballew 
accompanied you to New York 1 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. \Yas he on your pa:\~roll, !JIG? 
A. Xo sir. 
Q. How did you con1e to get Mr. Ballew to go 
with you to Xew York? 
A. l\lr. Ballew is an employee of Western Dairv 
Employees and he was loaned to our lo~l 
r nj on under my direction to help in this 
matter. 
Q. He was working and whatever he did was 
exclusively under your jurisdiction~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And direction Y 
A. Ye~ sir." (Tr. 1:24-1:26) 
Therefort>. if Local Union 976 is wholly an autono-
nlous union and an independent union that pays its own 
bills; that fixes and collects its own dues; that negotiates 
and signs ib own contracts. including the contracts with 
Mr. Gossner ever since the year. 19-!'7. and that the only 
connection it bears to the defendant International is the 
pa~·mpnt of dues at its headquarters in the City of 
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Washington, D.C., it is most bewildering to us upon what 
theory the International is sued and, furthermore, how 
a valid service of summons could be made upon Ballew 
or Rash in their capacity as officers of the International 
Union even under a 301 contract case pursuant to Section 
301 (d) of the Act or how the specific acts of Rash could 
be determined to be the acts of the International agent 
as required by Section 301 (e) of the Act or how Rash 
could be found, by any stretch of statutory interpretation, 
to be an authorized agent of the International pursuant 
to Section 301 (c) of the Act or how the Court would 
acquire jurisdiction under 303 (b) of the Act. 
The Court will perhaps note the effect of the word 
"only" in Section 303(a) of the Act. It reads: 
"Sec. 303. (a) It shall be unlawful; for the 
purposes of this section only, in an industry or 
activity affecting com1nerce, for any labor organi-
zation to engage in, or to induce or encourage 
the employees of any employer to engage in. a 
strike or a concerted refusal ..... " 
And also the limitations respecting the amount in 
controversy in Section 303(b) in reference to U.S. Dis-
trict Courts, which paragraph also gives authority to 
sue in state courts, provided, of course, the state court 
has jurisdiction over the party which aparently it does 
not here have. The causes of action set out in Section 
301 and Section 303 are entirely different. However, 
Section 301 relaxes the jurisdictional standards for U.S. 
District Courts. 
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lJ sually the best evidence of what the Congress of 
the United States means, is what it says. If it had said 
in Section 301 (d) that service of process may be made 
upon the International by serving an officer of the Inter-
national in its capacity or the International capacity, 
shall constitute service upon the labor organization, there 
might be an outside chance for the plaintiff to make a 
pitch in this behalf, but the Congress does not say that. 
It plainly says his capacity, meaning, of course, the 
authorized status of the man delegated such authority 
by the International rnion to so represent the Inter-
national Union in such capacity, shall constitute service 
upon the labor organization. Obviously, the word, "agent" 
in Section 301 (d) of the Act means a person authorized 
to act in the name of the labor organization so pursued. 
We 1nention the foregoing to illustrate the fact that 
the International is a stranger to this case and a fortiori 
the trial judge hirnself 1nust haYe had great doubt respect-
ing jurisdiction over the International Union, as the 
following colloquy at the conclusion of the case discloses: 
"THE corRT: The record Inay so show. 
"X ow I haYe one problen1 in connection with 
your motion, ~Ir. Hanson. what does the evidence 
~how to tie in the International Terunsters, I am 
"~I R. H AK~OX: ~lr. Rash testified he was 
trnsteP appointed by 2\lr. Jack Annan of Los 
.. :\ ng-PIP~. 
"11 HE COFRT: He was trustee of this Local 
trustee of thi~ Local and appointed. 
"~I R. HAX~ON": He was trustee of this Local 
and appointed hy nlr. Annan, Chairman of the 
so 
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Executive Board, that is in the evidence, and one 
of the Divisions of the Western Teamsters Union 
is one of the Divisions of the International Union, 
and I think he also testified he did represent his 
particular Dairy Council, which is part of the 
International Union. 
"THE COURT: I have that in mind too. To 
what extent does that bring in the International 
Union~ 
"1fR. HAXSON: If you have a particular 
individual coming from the West Coast organiza-
tion to handle this, and Mr. Ballew came to handle 
this situation to-
" THE COURT: The evidence shows the 
\V estern Conference was involved, if they are 
involved does that involve the International~ 
"MR. HANSON: I think so, because they 
are the part of the International, and Mr. Ballew 
was appointed by Jack Annan of Los Angeles, 
who was appointed by the International Board 
of the Union. These trustees are under the direc-
tion and control of the International Union. We 
have alleged in our complaint Mr. Ballew was 
a member of the Western Conference, and the 
Western Conference is like saying the country 
has four divisions and one of the divisions is 
Western Conference of Teamsters, which is an 
integral part of the Union. 
"MR. ALLEN: The Statute specifically says 
in determining whether any person acting for 
another, the question is whether the specific ads 
are actually ratified, shall not be controlling, it 
isn't necessary to show the acts authorized in 
advance or subsequently ratified to impose re-
sponsibility." 
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Whether the above remarks of adversary counsel 
persuaded the Court to refuse dismissal of the defendant 
International Union, we do not know. Certainly there 
is not and could not be any connection between Mr. 
Annand and Mr. Ballew except perhaps social and that 
is not shown, but respecting one aspect, we are certain. 
Either we do not understand the import of Section 301 (e) 
of the Act or it has been misread. It reads: 
"For the purposes of this section, in determin-
ing whether any person is acting as an agent of 
another person so as to make such other person 
responsible for his acts, the question of whether 
the specific acts performed were actually author-
ized or subsequently ratified shall not be con-
trolling." (emphasis ours) 
Regardless of the fact that this is a state court 
action and not covered by the jurisdictional amount in 
controversy exception applicable to Federal District 
Courts in Section 301, the above remarks respecting 
agency make no contribution to the applicable law be-
cause and by reason of the fact that no delegation of 
authorit~~ whatsoever is shown whereb~T either Ballew 
or Rash could or did act for the International Union. 
So whether the specific act under a general grant of 
authority was specifically authorized previously or con-
firlned subsequently is of no eonsequenee and incompe-
tent in the absence of authority to act for the Inter-
national generally or at all, that is to say, in the presence 
of a vacuun1 of authority on the part of the International. 
r~rhe reeord shows that Jack ~\nnand lives in Los 
j\ngeles, is president of Joint Council-!:~. has never been 
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in Ogden, has written no letters to Local No. 976; 
that Local 976 is an autonomous independent organiza-
tion. But assume that Jack Annand lived in Ogden and 
had been appointed by the International Union to nego-
tiate, sign and did negotiate and sign all contracts, con-
duct all meetings, collect and fix all dues, account for 
all moneys for and in behalf of the memberhsip of Local 
Union 976 until such time as a re-organization could be 
effected, by no stretch of the law of agency, could a 
valid claim be made that he was acting in a capacity 
for the International Union, such as to tie the Inter-
national Union with the picketing of Joint Council 67 
without an affirmative showing on the part of the Inter-
national Union executive management that it expressly 
authorized such grant of power to so act. 
A case which illustrates the flow of authority be-
tween an International Union and a local union within 
or without trusteeship is: "Farnsworth and Chambers 
Company vs. Sheet Metal Workers International Asso-
ciation, 125 Federal Supp. 830-35 LRRM 2582.'' 
Another case which we think illustrative of the prin-
ciple at hand is Axel Newman Company vs. Sheet Metal 
Workers, 37 LRRM 2038, from which we quote the court's 
conclusions : 
"1. Service of process upon a labor organ-
ization for purposes of suits brought under Sec-
tions 301 and 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act must, 
pursuant to Section 301 (d) of the Act, be effected 
by service upon an officer or agent of such labor 
organization. 
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"2. An 'agent' of a labor organization, with-
in the meaning of Section 301 (d) of the Act, is 
a person who is authorized to act for, in behalf 
of, or in the name of such labor organization. 
"3. E. C. vVinter is not an 'agent' of the 
International, within the meaning of Section 
301 (d) of the Act, by virtue of his membership 
in the International. 
"4. E. C. Winter is not an 'agent' of the 
International, within the meaning of Section 
301 (d) of the Act, by virtue of his membership 
in the Local. 
"5. The local is a self-governing unincorpor-
ated association whose officers and agents are 
elected and compensated by and are authorized 
to act for, on behalf of, and in the name of its 
own membership. Those said officers and agents 
are not, by virtue of such status, agents or sub-
agents of the International in the sense that they 
may act for, in behalf of, or in the name of the 
International and by their actions bind the Inter-
national. 
"6. E. C. \Vinter is not an "agent' of the 
International, within the meaning of Section 
301 (d), b~- virtue of his being the incumbent of 
the office of Business ~\gent or Representative 
of the Local. 
"7. E. C. \Vinter is not an 'agent' of the 
International within the 1neaning of Section 
301 (d) of the Aet by virtue of any special ap-
poinhnent to such capacity b~- the General Presi-
dent or an~- other general officer of the Inter-
national." 
Another ea~e illustrative of the agency principle 
involved herein is Dail,11 Rerie1c Corporation L's. Inter-
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national Typographical Union, 9 FRD :293, 17 Labor 
Cases 65,292, wherein it was held services of process 
upon the president of the local is not sufficient to confer 
upon the Court jurisdiction over the International in 
the absence of clear proof that the local's president or 
the local itself has express authority to represent the 
International as its agent. 
A quote from Senator Taft respecting agency from 
the floor of the Senate is set out in the case of Isu ra ndsen 
Company, Inc. vs. National111a-ritime EugiJleers !JrJtefit 
Association, 9 FRD 541. 17 Labor Cases (i3,-l-:13, to wit : 
"Some of the provisions of this bill deal \vith 
the question of making the unions responsible. 
There is no reason in the world why a union should 
not have the same responsibility that a corpora-
tion has which is engaged in business. So we have 
provided that a union may be sued as if it were 
a corporation." 
Now if the law of agency applicable to a private 
corporation and its subsidiary is to be altered to confonn 
to plaintiff's theory of agency respecting the ;.;tatu;.; of 
Ballew and Rash in the case at bar, then, and in such 
an event, an agent of one of the coal, oil, trucking or 
other subsidiaries of the Union Pacific Rairoad ( ~omp<w~· 
would become agents of the parent company. In the case 
of a private corporation, the controlling company not 
only owns all of the stock of the subsidiary generally 
but interlocks its own directors and officers on the boards 
of the subsidiaries so as to achieve virtually hundn:d 
per cent control, whereas with the International Union 
' 
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not only is the local union self-controlled and autonomous 
generally, but most all the International can do or does 
do is collect per capita tax from the local union and 
can't do that from a joint council. Even in the presence 
of dishonesty, negligence and mismanagement, approxi-
JHatel:· all the International "Cnion rnay do is temporarily 
take charge of the money affairs only of the local union, 
and we here ernphasize, not for the International's benefit 
but for the exclusive benefit of the local union member-
ship, and only until such time as local union member-
ship management is restored to full control. In neither 
case does the local union management act for anyone 
ebe except the local union membership. Hence, if the 
authors of Section 303 of the Act intended to permit 
suits against a union upon the same basis as that appli-
cable to a private corporation which does not expressly 
authorize a subsidiary to so act, and the language of 
Section 303 indicates such authorized agent must be a 
person, in ~uch event Rash could not possibly be an 
agent for the International Union nor Ballew an agent 
of the \V estern Conference of Teamsters, so as to tie 
the International and Western Conferences of Teamsters 
to t lw picketing of the truck by Joint Council 67 upon 
the public streets of New York City. 
In closing this portion of our brief, we especially 
invite the Court's attention to the fact that the burden 
i:-; upon the plaintiff to prove that the International 
Union i::-~ the type of labor organization as defined in 
s~·<·tioll ~ ( J) 0 r th<:> .. \d; this is essential to plaintiff's 
ea1"e and in :-;ueh behalf it produced no evidence pursuant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to Section 303; and furthermore notwithstanding defend-
ants Ballew, Rash and Lott have been dismissed, nowhere 
in the evidence does it appear that the Internatjonal 
Union or the Western Conference of Teamsters mali-
ciously or otherwise conspired with the dismissed defend-
ants or the remaining defendants or anyone or at all, 
as alleged by plaintiffs in paragraphs 6 and 7 of its 
complaint; that nowhere in the evidence does it appear 
that the International Union hired Ballew or Rash or 
gave them any orders or directions or communicated 
with them or knew them. 
\Y e challenge adversary council to produce one single 
case where an International lJnion has been successfully 
sued pursuant to Section 303, unless it is a case after 
the fashion of a United Mine Workers 50 case which is 
the International Union or unless International Union 
officers had control and personally planned and actively 
participated in the tort complained of, all of course in 
the scope of the agency and at the instance of the Inter-
national Union. 
We submit the Court manifestly erred in its refusal 
to strike and dismiss the International Union as a part:· 
defendant. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
THE JOINT AND SEVERAL MOTIONS OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS, MADE AT THE ·CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE 
OF PLAINTIFF, TO DIRECT THE JURY TO BRING IN A 
VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM, OR, 
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IF THAT MAY NOT BE DONE, TO DISMISS THE ACTION. 
(Tr. 232) 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
THE JOINT AND SEVERAL MOTIONS OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS, MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL THE EVI-
DENCE, TO DIRECT THE JURY TO BRING IN A VERDICT 
FOR DEFENDANTS, OR, IF THAT MAY NOT BE DONE, 
TO DISMISS THE ACTION. (Tr. 342-4) 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO 
THE JURY DEFENDANTS' REQUEST NO. 1 WHEREBY DE-
FENDANTS REQUESTED THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY TO BRING IN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFEND-
ANTS AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF NO CAl:SE OF ACTION. 
(Tr. 28) 
POINT VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ENTER A JUDGMENT FOR 
DEFENDANTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
The questions of law r.aised by Points Five, Six, 
Scn_'n and Eight are substantially the same. and, there-
fore, our discussion under thi:-: heading is intended to 
a pp I~- to each and all of such points. 
Plaintiff elaim~ that it was put out of business by 
what Ha~h. Lott and Ball(_•w did and said at the place of 
lm:-; i 1w:-;:-; of Donnan and C01npany in X ew York on or 
ahont tJ ul~· :2G. and :21. 1955. X o elain1 is n1ade that any 
danmg-<' wa~ done as a rPsnlt of the picketing to the cheese 
ss 1 
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contained in the truck that was picketed. The sole claim 
made by plaintiff is that it lost future profits that it might 
have made if it had not lost its market to sell Swiss cheese 
to N. Dorman and Company. Even if this Court should 
conclude, contrary to defendants' contention, that de-
fendants, or some of them, were guilty of wrongdoing in 
picketing the trucks, yet the evidence falls far short of 
showing that plaintiff is entitled to any money judgment 
against defendants, or either of them. We say that be-
cause: First. The evidence touching the question of any 
damage which plaintiff may have sustained is so un-
certain, contingent and speculative that it will not support 
the amount of the verdict of the jury, or any part thereof. 
Second. That the evidence shows plaintiff had no con-
tract with Cache Valley Dairy Association whereby it 
was entitled to continue to purchase Swiss cheese, and 
had no contract with N. Dorman and Company whereby 
N. Dorman and Company was obligated to purchase 
cheese from plaintiff. Third. There is no substantial com-
petent evidence that N. Dorman and Company refused 
to continue to purchase cheese from plaintiff because of 
the picketing of the truck of plaintiff. Fourth. The evi-
dence affirmatively shows that N. Dorman and Company 
were willing to continue to purchase, and did purchase, 
Swiss cheese delivered by plaintiff after the picketing 
complained of. Fifth. That the evidence conclusively 
shows that the business of plaintiff in transporting Swiss 
cheese from Utah to New York, and other materials frmn 
the East to Utah, was unlawful in that plaintiff did not 
have, and probably could not have, secured a permit from 
the Interstate Commerce Commission to engage in that 
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business. We shall discuss this last mentioned n1atter 
under the next heading. 
In Instruction No. 11 the jury was instructed: 
"* * * that to warrant a recovery for loss of 
profit which plaintiff claims it lost by reason of 
the acts complained of, the evidence must establish 
the amount of loss with reasonable certainty, and 
no recovery can be had for loss of profits which 
are uncertain contingent, conjectural or specula-
tive, that is to say: that if by any chance or under 
any condition of affairs existing at the time and 
times complained of, no profits would have ac-
crued even though the act complained of had not 
occurred, there can be no allowance for profits 
lost, and your verdict must be for defendants." 
The foregoing instruction is in harmony with the au-
thorities generally. See: 15 Am. Jur. 558, Sec. 150, and 
numerous cases cited under notes 8 and 9 to the text. 
To the same effect is the statement of the law in 25 C.J.S. 
page 516, Sec. 42, where additional cases are cited in foot-
notes to the text. We have been unable to find a Utah 
case where the question has been decided on facts com-
parable with the facts disclosed by the evidence in this 
case. The case of United States Y. Griffith, et al.~ 310 
Fed. ( 2d) 11. arose in Utah and was decided by the lOth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. It lends color to the contention 
of defendants. In nun1erous cases our Supreme Court 
has held that generally the instructions given to the 
jury, if not objected to, become the law of the case, and 
as such are not open to attack. An1ong such cases are: 
Morgan v. Ch!}d, Cole and Co., 61 Utah -!48. 213 Pac.177; 
Schubach v. American Suref!l Co. of ~Tew York, 73 Utah 
332, 27:~ Pae. D7 4; Straka v. r oyles, 69 lTtah 123, 252 Pac. 
m1. go 
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It would be a Herculean task to review the cases cited 
in the texts above referred to, and, therefore, we conceive 
it to be more profitable to point out to the Court the fail-
ure of the evidence to support the judgment appealed 
from rather than to review the numerous cases dealing 
with the question now being considered. 
Plaintiff offered in evidence loose leaf books which 
it claims contained a record of its business during the 
time it was engaged in transporting Swiss cheese fron1 
Cache Valley, Utah, to New York, and other articles fron1 
the East to Utah. At the time the books were so offered, 
Counsel for defendants stated that no objection would be 
made to the admission at the time of the offer, but prob-
ably objection would be made after an opportunity was 
had to examine the books and further cross examination 
was had of the bookkeeper. (Tr. 68) There the matter 
was left and nothing further was said or done about the 
admission of the books so offered in evidence. 
It is defendants' contention that the books were not 
shown to be competent evidence, and that even if the same 
were admitted in evidence, the contents thereof would at 
best be hearsay and insufficient to support the verdict 
of the jury or the judgment based thereon. 
This action is against strangers to the transactions 
claimed to be reflected in the loose leaf books which were 
offered in evidence. The law under such circumstances 
is thus stated in Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. 
4, Chapter 18, pages 3284, et seq., where it is said that 
the general rule is well established that books of account 
' including shop books, may not be used as evidence upon 
issues between third persons; that entries in such books 
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as to third persons are res inter alios acta and inadmis-
sible against persons not parties to them unless a founda-
tion is laid for their admission on special grounds. It is 
further said by the same author, page 3312, that entries 
must be made specific and particular, and that when 
charges are made in gross, such entries must be rejected. 
Such books, however, are admissible as an admission of 
the party keeping the books. The same doctrine is stated 
to be the law in 22 C . .J. 877 and 32 C . .J.S. 573, where cases 
are collected in support of the text. Such is stated to be 
the law by this Court in the case of Eureka Hill Jfining 
Co. v. Bullion Beck & Champion Mining Co., 32 rtah 236, 
90 Pac. 157. On the bottom of page 245 of the r tah Re-
port it is said: 
"They were kept (the books involved) by a 
private corporation solely for its own purpose and 
in the administration of its internal affairs, and I 
do not think under any rule of evidence they may 
be cmnpetent as ''itnesses to isolated and collater-
al facts in a suit between the corporation and a 
stranger." 
There are other reasons why the books of plaintiff 
are without probative value in tlris case. Among which 
are : A reading of the testilnony of Arne Hansen, the 
bookkeeper of plaintiff, wlrich will be found on pages 209 
to 229 of the Transcript, and wlrich has heretofore been 
sum1narized, will show that the witness had no first hand 
information of the facts purported to be recorded in the 
books, and that it would take a week to get the informa-
tion as to the source of profits for one year: that he could 
not tPil what wa~ 1nade in hauling freight and what was 
n1ade in the pnrcha~e and sale of property, etc. An exami· 
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nation of the books will show that the lack of information 
of witness Hansen is well founded. That the books are 
conspicuous for what information they fail to contain 
rather than what they do contain. 
The audit made by Bunker, Tanner and Garrett for 
the year 1953-± up to September 30, 1955, was received 
in evidence as Exhibit P -3. As to the information re-
flected in that Exhibit it is obvious that if the source from 
which such information was acquired is without probative 
value, the audit would likewise be valueless. ~Ioreover, 
that Exhibit is fatally defective as to whether or not the 
business of plaintiff would prove to be profitable in the 
future. Among its infirmaties are: The audit sho·ws an 
expense for a strike notwithstanding the evidence shows 
that there was no strike against plaintiff. It is made to 
appear that the office salaries for the year ending Sep~ 
tember 30, 1953, was only $300.00, in the year September 
30, 1954, only $375.00, while in the year ending September 
30, 1955, such expenses were $1200.00. The General Ad-
ministration expenses for the year ending on September 
30, 1953, is placed at nothing, the year ending September 
30, 1954, is placed at $55.87, and for the ~'Par ending 
September 30, 1955, such expense is placed at $781.19. 
It is, we submit, a matter of common knowledge that a 
manager of a business that makes sales of property of thP 
value of $862,574.60 during one year, $1,407,350 for thP 
next year, and $65,829.28 for only a part of the next ~·ear, 
cannot be conducted for two of the years for nothing, and 
for $55.87 and $781.19, respectively, for the next year and 
fraction of a year respectively. We wish to further oh-
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serve that under the case heretofore cited from Jones on 
Evidence the gross statement of profits in the books and 
the audit thereof must be rejected, because even if re-
ceivable by those who are parties to a transaction, they 
are hearsay, and in the nature of a conclusion unless the 
particularity of the transaction are revealed by the entry. 
Before leaving this phase of the case, we wish to 
1nake the further observation that even if the books of 
plaintiff and the audit thereof were received in evidence 
' if, as the authorities hold, ~uch evidence is hearsay, no 
1natter how much of such evidence is admitted, the same 
without some competent evidence "ill not support a 
judgment. Moreover, the evidence shows that the Dorman 
Company continued to receive cheese delivered to it by 
plaintiff after the picketing cmnplained of, and that it 
"·as willing to continue to do so without regard to whether 
the same was delivered by plaintiff or othermse. (Tr. 
:273, 298 and 301) 
POINT IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO TAKE THE CASE FROM THE JURY AND RENDER A 
JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THE EVI-
DENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
AT THE Til\IE AND TIMES COMPLAINED OF UNLAW-
FULLY ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AND MAY 
NOT RECOVER DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF THE ACTS 
COMPLAINED OF. 
POINT X. 
• THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
DEFENDANTS TO FILE THEIR MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT 
OF DEAN T. CORBETT IN SUPPORT THEREOF TORE-
LIEVE DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM, OF THE 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THEM, AND REFUSING TO GRANT 
SUC~ MOTION. 
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Under Points nine and ten defendants will discuss 
their claim that the evidence shows without conflict that 
plaintiff, during the time and times complained of, was 
unlawfully engaged in interstate commerce; that the 
affidavit of Dean F. Corbett lends additional support 
to such claim; that the Court erred in refusing to permit 
the filing of such Affidavit, and in refm:;ing to relieve 
defendants from the judgment appealed from. 
We quote the following from the laws of the United 
States dealing with the transportation of property: / 
U.S.C.A., Title 49, Sec. 303, contains, among other t 
provisions, the following: \ \ 
"Sec. 6. The term permit means a permit is- \ 
sued under this chapter to contract carriers by 
motor vehicle. 
"Sec. 10. The term interstate commerce 
means commerce between any place in a state and 
any place in another state or between places in 
the same state through another state whether such 
commerce moves wholly by motor vehicle or partly 
by motor vehicle and partly by rail express or 
water. 
"Sec. 15. The term contract carrier by motor 
vehicle means any person which under individual 
contracts or agreements engages in the transpor-
tation other than transportation referred to in 
paragraph (14) of this section and the exception 
therein (common carriers) by motor. vehicle of 
passengers or property in interstate or foreign 
commerce for compensation. · 
"(17) The term private carrier of property 
by motor vehicle means any person not included 
in the term common carrier by motor vehicle or 
contract carrier by motor vehicle who or which 
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transports, in interstate or foreign commerce, 
motor vehicle property of which such person is 
the owner, lessee or bailee when such transporta-
tion is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent or bail-
Inent, or is in furtherance of anY commercial enter-
prise." ~ 
Subsection (b) provides that the provisions of Title 
49 do not apply to motor vehicles controlled and oper-
ated by any fanner ,,·hen used in the transportation of 
his agricultural c01nmodities and products thereof, or in 
the transportation of supplies to his farm, or ( 5) motor 
vehicles controlled and operated by cooperative associa-
tions as defined in Sections 11±1-1141a, ll±le and ll±lj 
of Title 1~, or by a federation of such-cooperative associa-
tions, if such federations possess no greater powers or 
purposes than cooperative associations defined, or (6) 
n1otor vehicles used in carrying property consisting of 
ordinary livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agri-
cultural cmnmodities (not including manufactured prod-
ucts thereof), if such n1otor vehicles are not used in carry-
ing any other property or passengers for compensation. 
Section 304, Subdirisio11 (:2) of Title 49 provides, · 
a1nong other 1natters. that it shall be the duty of the 
Interstate Con11nerce Conuuission: 
.. To regulate contract carriers by motor ve-
hi(·le a~ pro,~ided in this chapter. and to that end 
tlH' eonnui~~ion 1naY establish reasonable require-
nHmt~ 'dth n"'~pPd 'to uniform systen1 of accounts, 
r<'enrrl~. and report~. pre~erYation of records, 
qualifications and maxin1un1 hours of service of 
Pmplo~·ee~ and safet~- of operation and equip-
nlent." 
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Section 309 of Title 49 provides that no person shall 
engage in the business of a contract carrier by motor 
vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce on any public 
highway within any reservation under the exclusive juris-
diction of the United States unless there is in force with 
respect to such carrier a permit issued by the commission 
authorizing such person to engage in such business. There 
are some exceptions to the above provision, but the evi-
dence in this case shows that plaintiff does not fall within 
the exception. 
The foregoing section contains provisions as to the 
proceedings required to secure a permit and as to the 
need of the service and the ability of the applicant to per-
form the same. 
Section 311 of Title 49 provides that a broker who 
arranges for transportation by a contract motor carrier 
shall have a license issued by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. 
Bection 312 of Title 49 provides for the transfer, 
change and revocation of a permit. 
Section 315 of Title 49 provides for the furnishing of 
security for the protection 6f the public. 
Section 318 provides for the establishment and ob-
servance of reasonable minimum rates and charges of 
a contract carrier and to file the same with the Commis-
sion. 
Section 322 provides for the punishment for anyone 
who violates the provisions of the act. 
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Since the enactment of the Federal Transportation 
Act there have been a number of cases wherein the courts 
have been called upon to construe the act. We shall dis-
cuss two of such cases which have been decided hy the 
Federal Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in one of which 
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the rnited 
States. In light of the fact that Utah is within the Tenth 
(_ 
1ircuit Court and federal law is involved, this Court 
~hould be bound by said decisions. 
The facts in the case of Stickle Co. v. Interstate Com-
merce Comntission, (lOth Cir.) 128 Fed. (2d) 155; certi-
orari denied, 317 U.S. 650; 63 S. Ct. 46, 87 L. Ed. 523, 
were these: 
The Stickle Company was a corporation ·which owned 
and operated ten motor vehicles which were used to trans-
port lumber from :Mills located in Oklahoma, Texas, 
Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and Illinois. The company 
hired the drivers and owned the trucks, together with 
storage yards in Oklahoma City. It advertised that it had 
lumber for sale. When orders for lmuber were given, it 
proceeded to purchase the lu1nber ordered and deliver the 
same to the purchaser. It was held that the transporta-
tion of lumber by the emupany was not an incident to a 
comn1ercial enterprise. and that on the contrary the buy-
ing and selling lu1nber is a 1neans and deviee employed 
hy the company to enable it to engage in the transporta-
tion of lumber as a eontrart carrier without eomplying 
with the provisions of the law with respect to eontract 
<'arners. It was so held as a matter of law. In the eourse 
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of the opinion the Court quoted with approval from the 
case of George Truck Systems, Inc. v. Interstate Com-
1nerce Commission, (5th Cir.) 123 Fed. (2d) 210, at 212, 
where it is said: 
"We need not indulge here in any of these 
refinements. It is sufficient for us to say that the 
invoked statute is a highly remedial one, that the 
terms are broadly comprehensive enough to bring 
them all, all of those who, no matter what forms 
they use, are in substance engaged in the business 
of interstate or foreign transportation of property 
on the highways for hire." 
It may be noted that in the Stickle case above cited 
Judge Huxley dissented upon the ground that the law 
permitted an owner of property to transport the same 
without complying with the law, if it did so in good faith, 
and that as the law permitted an owner of property to 
transport the same without securing a permit from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, it was the function 
of Congress and not the courts to amend the law so as 
to make the same apply to cases like the Stickle case. 
In the case of Scott v. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, 213 Fed. 30, these were the material facts: 
Scott was the successful bidder to sell and deliver 
to the Hollaman Air base in New Mexico between Decem-
ber 1, 1951, and May, 1952, 625,000 gallons of fuel oil, and 
he performed the contract on his part by purchasing the 
product from a refinery in New Mexico and transp~rted 
the same by tank trucks to the airbase, and there deliver-
ed it. Scott entered into a written contract with the Shell 
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Oil Company, a distributor of gasoline and other petro-
leum products, in which he agreed to sell to such company 
at delivered prices large quantities of first structure 
gasoline. Similar contracts "Were entered into with other 
purchasers of gasoline. His delivered charge was the 
cost of the product at the refinery plus an additional 
charge which was comparable to but less than the cost of 
transportation of common carriers. He bore the loss from 
the failure of the product to meet quality requirements, 
loss from storage, loss from spoilage and loss from the 
failure of the customer to accept delivery. He did not 
perform any service from which he could gain a profit 
except the service of transportation. It was held by the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the foregoing Scott 
case that the legal ownership of the product at the time 
of its transportation is not necessarily controlling in de-
tennining whether the one transporting the property is a 
contract carrier or a private carrier. That Scott's pri-
mary business being that of transporting gasoline and 
other petroleum products under individual contracts or 
agreetnents for compensation he falls within the elass of 
contract carriers even though title to such products is 
vested in him at the time of their transportation. 
If we con1pare the facts in the foregoing cases with 
th~ facts in the present case, it will readily be seen that 
the facts in this case are much stronger in establishing 
that plaintiff was at all tunes here involved a contract 
carrier. Thus it appears from the testimony of Mr. 
0 o~~nPr that plaii1tiff was created for the express pur-
po~(' of transporting the Swiss eht•ese Inanufactured by 
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the Dairy Association to market; the contract of employ-
ment of Mr. Gossner provides that the title to the prop-
erty at all times should remain \Vith the Dairy Associa-
tion. The payment for the cheese was made to the Dairy 
Association in most cases the same day that the Dorman 
Company paid plaintiff. When Dorman wrote the letter, 
plaintiff's Exhibit P-4, it was addressed to Cache \T alle~T 
Dairy, and not to plaintiff. Plaintiff was without funds 
to pay for the cheese unless and until Dorman paid for 
the cheese. So far as appears plaintiff assumed none of 
the risk of the loss, or spoilage of the cheese in transpor-
tation or the refusal of Dorman to accept or pay for the 
cheese. It is submitted that the facts in this case con-
clusively show that plaintiff at the time and times here 
involved was a contract carrier, and as such its operations 
were unlawful in transporting the cheese to X e\Y York 
without first complying with the Federal Transportation 
Act dealing with contract carriers. 
There is another provision of the Federal Transpor-
tation Act affecting contract carriers which deserves brief 
mention. We refer to sub-paragraph b (4a) of Section 
303 of Title 49, U.S.C.A., wherein it is provided that the 
Act shall not apply to motor vehicles used in carrying 
property consisting of ordinary livestock, fish (including 
shell fish) or agricultural commodities (not including 
manufactured products thereof), if such motor vPh i<·l<>s 
are not used in carrying any other property or J>assen!.(Prs 
for compensation. Plaintiff does not bring itself within 
the exception because Swiss cheese is a manufacturP<l 
product. Frozen Food Express v. United Stales, c! ul .. 
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1:28 Fed. Supp. 37 4, 351 U.S. 40. For a review of the cases 
dealing with that matter - 12 Federal Cases, Section 
81,100. 
rrhe trucks of plaintiff, according to the testimony 
of its \Vitness Hansen, were at times used to haul freight 
fron1 the east for compensation. The evidence with re-
spect to the claim that plaintiff acquired title to property 
in the East and resold the same here in Utah contains 
!·he same information as does the claim of title to the 
cheese. ~Ioreover, even if the plaintiff for a time was suc-
cessful in hauling freight fron1 the East to "Ctah for com-
pensation without a permit, it would be pure speculation 
to conclude that it could continue to do so without a per-
mit or to conclude that plaintiff could secure a permit. 
So also does the testimony of ~Ir. Gossner show· that a 
profit could not be n1ade by plaintiff without a backhaul 
fron1 the East. 
Fr01n what has been said it is apparent that plain-
tijf is here seeking to recover damages because of a claim 
that it ha~ been put out of conducting an unla-wful busi-
ne:-;~. a business that it never had a right to pursue. \Ye 
haY(' been unable to find a rase where damages have been 
aJlowed because one has been deprived of anticipated 
profits to lw derived fr01n conducting an unlawful busi-
ne:-;~. \\'" f' doubt that any such case can be found. The 
court:-; generally hold that one may not recover damages 
growing out of the breach of a-n unlawful contract. 1~ 
A Ill. Jur. Sc('. 153~ papc ().fi. BakerY. La.tses. 60 rtah38, 
21Hi Pa1·. ;););~: Short Y. Bullion Beck J!in. Co .. ~0 Ftah ~0. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
57 Pac. 720. For much stronger reasons one may not 
recover damages on account of anticipated profits to be 
derived from the continuation of an unlawful business. 
It may be noted that the fact that the perpetrator 
• of an unlawful act does not know the act to be unlawful, 
but believes it to be lawful, does not excuse the perform-
ance of the act. 12 Am. Jur. Sec. 153, page 647, and 
cases cited in footnote. 
Attention is again called to the testimony of .Jir. 
Gossner that plaintiff did not have a permit from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission to engage in the trans-
portation of property in interstate commerce, and that 
Mr. Gossner, while he was probably a broker, there is 
no evidence that he had a license to serve as such as 
provided in Section 311, Title 49, U.S.C.A. above qttoted. 
(Tr. 84) So also is there no dispute that some of plain-
tiff's profits came from hauling freight. (Tr. 31) The 
affidavit of .Jfr. Corbett shows that the transaction 
whereby :Mr. Gossner testified that he bought the cheese 
from the Cache Valley Association, and sold the same 
to the Dormans and is not bonafide, or, if so, such trans-
actions do not relieve plaintiff from necessity of SP('U r-
ing a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission 
as required by the law above cited as (·onstrued by the 
cases above mentioned. That being so the court below 
erred in refusing to permit the motion and affidavit to 
relieve defendants from the judgment appealed from. 
Doubtless, defendants had a right to file the motion and 
affidavit, and, therefore, the Court erred in refm;iug 
permission to file the same. However, if, cont nu·~· to 
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defendants' contention, the motion and affidavit could 
not aid defendants, then and under such circumstances 
defendants were not prejudiced. But the facts recited in 
th(• affidavit precludes plaintiff from the recovery of any 
judgment in its favor, and entitles defendants to be • 
relieved from the judgment appealed from as provided 
l>~· n?tle 60 (b) (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
By our discussion of the rights of defendants to be re-
lieved from the judgment rendered against them, ·we do 
not wish to be understood as conceding that the verdict 
and judgment are without support in the evidence inde-
pendent of the averments contained in the affidavit of 
:JI r. Corbett. 
POINT ELEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING AN OB-
JECTION TO THE TESTIMONY OFFERED BY THEIR WIT-
NESS, CLARENCE LOTT, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 
WAGES PAID AT THE CACHE YALLEY PLANT WERE 
LESS THAN THAT PAID IN ADJOINIXG TERRITORY. (Tr. 
331) 
The attention of the Court is called to the testimony 
of ~[r. Thoresen, a witness called by plaintiff wherein he 
tc>:-:tifierl that he was infonned by :Jir. Rash that the 
wap;P:-: in Star Valley were twenty per cent less than at 
Ca<'lw \~alley Co-op. ( Tr. 179) The testinwny offered 
h~· ~r r. Lott was to refute any claiin that the wages at 
:--;tar Valley was twenty per cent less than that at the 
Ca<'IH· \'allP)' Co-op. r~eo pennit such testin1ony as that of 
Mr. Thore~wn to go undisputed could not help but preju-
di<·<' tlw jury against defendants. 
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POINT TWELVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING, OVER 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION, THE ADMISSION IN EVI-
DENCE OF EXHIBIT P-4. (Tr. 338) 
Exhibit P-4 puports to be a letter sent by Dorman 
to the Cache Valley Dairy. It is dated August 22, 1955, 
and is as follows: 
"Dear Ed: 
This is to let you know that the trailer fron1 
:Mid-States arrived this morning and we were not 
permitted to unload as our Union Delegate forbid 
this merchandise. We need this cheese and any-
thing you can do to get this clear for unloading 
will be appreciated. 
(N.Y.) 
Vic 
Victor Dorman" 
N. Dorman & Co., Inc. 
Very truly yours, 
It will be seen that the letter is not addressed to 
plaintiff. There is no evidence that the writing of this 
letter had anything to do with the picketing complained 
of. No opportunity was given the defendants to cross 
examine Victor Dorman as to what caused him to writP 
the letter. That being so, it was extremely prejudicial 
to permit the jury to speculate as to what was the occa-
sion for writing the letter, or whether or not t hP defend-
ants had anything to do with the matter which brought 
about the writing of the letter. 
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POINT THIRTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S EXHIBIT P-16 TO BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE. 
(Tr. 339) 
That Exhibit purports to be an audit of some of the 
books of plaintiff. The record fails to show whether the 
books claimed to have been audited were or were notre-
ceived in evidence. That being so, it would seem self-
evident that the Exhibit was incompetent. 
POINT FOURTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
A NEW TRIAL. 
If defendants are entitled to prevail on their attacks 
on the judgment upon the grounds urged, that, of course, 
would put an end to this litigation. If, however, the Court 
should, contrary to our contention conclude otherwise, 
then defendants urge that a new trial be granted. In 
addition to the errors heretofore discussed, there is a 
failure of any endeavor to support a verdict for the 
amount awarded. At the legal rate of interest the judg-
ment, if paid, would produce an income of $6000.00 a 
year. That would mean that in less than seventeen years 
plaintiff would realize the amount of the judgment in 
interest and still have the principal left, and that with-
out engaging in any business other than lending the 
money. It 1nay be asked where is there any evidence in 
this reeord which ~how~ or tends to show how long a busi-
ness such as that of plaintiff would continue to exist. To 
infonu the jury as wa~ done in Instruction ~ o. 9 was to 
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invite the jury to make a guess as to the damages that 
plaintiff might sustain on account of the picketing of 
one of its trucks and is, we submit, to require the jury to 
engage in unadulterated speculation. 
In our search we have been unable to find a case 
where an instruction such as No.9 has been approved by 
a court of last resort. We have found c.ases where the 
measure of damages for destroying a business has been 
fixed at its market value at the time it was destroyed, 
but we doubt that any case from a court of last resort can 
be found where a jury has been permitted to speculate on 
how long a business will continue to exist without some 
evidence upon which to base such a determination. 
It is respectfully sub1nitted that the judgment ap-
pealed from be reversed, that the court below be directed 
to enter a judgment in favor of the defendants, and each 
of them, and that appellants be awarded their costs on 
their appeal and in the tri.al court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARENCE M. BECK 
A. PARK SMOOT 
and 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
107 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
